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Message-ID: <20191211152435.GN2827@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 16:24:35 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, elena.reshetova@...el.com,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure
Perf users groups
On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 01:52:15PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> Undoubtedly, SELinux is the powerful, mature, whole level of functionality that
> could provide benefits not only for perf_events subsystem. However perf_events
> is built around capabilities to provide access control to its functionality,
> thus perf_events would require considerable rework prior it could be controlled
> thru SELinux.
You mean this:
da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
?
> Then the adoption could also require changes to the installed
> infrastructure just for the sake of adopting alternative access control mechanism.
This is still very much true.
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