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Message-ID: <20191211203648.GA862919@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:36:48 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
elena.reshetova@...el.com,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure
Perf users groups
> > In this circumstances CAP_SYS_PERFMON looks like smart balanced advancement that
> > trade-offs between perf_events subsystem extensions, required level of control
> > and configurability of perf_events, existing users adoption effort, and it brings
> > security hardening benefits of decreasing attack surface for the existing users
> > and use cases.
>
> I'm not 100% opposed to CAP_SYS_PERFMON. I am 100% opposed to new capabilities
> that have a single use. Surely there are other CAP_SYS_ADMIN users that [cs]ould
> be converted to CAP_SYS_PERFMON as well. If there is a class of system performance
> privileged operations, say a dozen or so, you may have a viable argument.
perf events is not a single use. It has a bazillion of sub functionalities,
including hardware tracing, software tracing, pmu counters, software counters,
uncore counters, break points and various other stuff in its PMU drivers.
See it more as a whole quite heterogenous driver subsystem.
I guess CAP_SYS_PERFMON is not a good name because perf is much more
than just Perfmon. Perhaps call it CAP_SYS_PERF_EVENTS
-Andi
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