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Message-ID: <CAK8P3a2QYpT_u3D7c_w+hoyeO-Stkj5MWyU_LgGOqnMtKLEudg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2019 14:17:08 +0100
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Segher Boessenkool <segher@...nel.crashing.org>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: READ_ONCE() + STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG == :/ (was Re: [GIT PULL]
Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops))
On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 9:50 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 11:34 AM Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
> > The root of my concern in all of this, and what started me looking at it in
> > the first place, is the interaction with 'typeof()'. Inheriting 'volatile'
> > for a pointer means that local variables in macros declared using typeof()
> > suddenly start generating *hideous* code, particularly when pointless stack
> > spills get stackprotector all excited.
>
> Yeah, removing volatile can be a bit annoying.
>
> For the particular case of the bitops, though, it's not an issue.
> Since you know the type there, you can just cast it.
>
> And if we had the rule that READ_ONCE() was an arithmetic type, you could do
>
> typeof(0+(*p)) __var;
>
> since you might as well get the integer promotion anyway (on the
> non-volatile result).
>
> But that doesn't work with structures or unions, of course.
>
> I'm not entirely sure we have READ_ONCE() with a struct. I do know we
> have it with 64-bit entities on 32-bit machines, but that's ok with
> the "0+" trick.
I'll have my randconfig builder look for instances, so far I found one,
see below. My feeling is that it would be better to enforce at least
the size being a 1/2/4/8, to avoid cases where someone thinks
the access is atomic, but it falls back on a memcpy.
Arnd
diff --git a/drivers/xen/time.c b/drivers/xen/time.c
index 0968859c29d0..adb492c0aa34 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/time.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/time.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu_delta(
do {
state_time = get64(&state->state_entry_time);
rmb(); /* Hypervisor might update data. */
- *res = READ_ONCE(*state);
+ memcpy(res, state, sizeof(*res));
rmb(); /* Hypervisor might update data. */
} while (get64(&state->state_entry_time) != state_time ||
(state_time & XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE));
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 5e88e7e33abe..f4ae360efdba 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct
ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
#include <uapi/linux/types.h>
+extern void __broken_access_once(void *, const void *, unsigned long);
+
#define __READ_ONCE_SIZE \
({ \
switch (size) { \
@@ -187,9 +189,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct
ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
case 4: *(__u32 *)res = *(volatile __u32 *)p; break; \
case 8: *(__u64 *)res = *(volatile __u64 *)p; break; \
default: \
- barrier(); \
- __builtin_memcpy((void *)res, (const void *)p, size); \
- barrier(); \
+ __broken_access_once((void *)res, (const void *)p,
size); \
} \
})
@@ -225,9 +225,7 @@ static __always_inline void
__write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
case 4: *(volatile __u32 *)p = *(__u32 *)res; break;
case 8: *(volatile __u64 *)p = *(__u64 *)res; break;
default:
- barrier();
- __builtin_memcpy((void *)p, (const void *)res, size);
- barrier();
+ __broken_access_once((void *)p, (const void *)res, size);
}
}
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