Message-ID: <157619653837.3810.9657617422595030033@sif>
Date:   Thu, 12 Dec 2019 18:22:18 -0600
From:   Michael Roth <mdroth@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@...abs.ru>, Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>
Cc:     mpe@...erman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        benh@...nel.crashing.org, david@...son.dropbear.id.au,
        paulus@...abs.org, hch@....de, andmike@...ibm.com,
        sukadev@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mst@...hat.com, ram.n.pai@...il.com,
        cai@....pw, tglx@...utronix.de, bauerman@...ux.ibm.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, leonardo@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] powerpc/pseries/iommu: Share the per-cpu TCE page with
 the hypervisor.

Quoting Alexey Kardashevskiy (2019-12-11 16:47:30)
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2019 07:31, Michael Roth wrote:
> > Quoting Alexey Kardashevskiy (2019-12-11 02:15:44)
> >>
> >>
> >> On 11/12/2019 02:35, Ram Pai wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 04:32:10PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On 10/12/2019 16:12, Ram Pai wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 02:07:36PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 07/12/2019 12:12, Ram Pai wrote:
> >>>>>>> H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT hcall uses a page filled with TCE entries, as one of
> >>>>>>> its parameters.  On secure VMs, hypervisor cannot access the contents of
> >>>>>>> this page since it gets encrypted.  Hence share the page with the
> >>>>>>> hypervisor, and unshare when done.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I thought the idea was to use H_PUT_TCE and avoid sharing any extra
> >>>>>> pages. There is small problem that when DDW is enabled,
> >>>>>> FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE is ignored (easy to fix); I also noticed complains
> >>>>>> about the performance on slack but this is caused by initial cleanup of
> >>>>>> the default TCE window (which we do not use anyway) and to battle this
> >>>>>> we can simply reduce its size by adding
> >>>>>
> >>>>> something that takes hardly any time with H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT,  takes
> >>>>> 13secs per device for H_PUT_TCE approach, during boot. This is with a
> >>>>> 30GB guest. With larger guest, the time will further detoriate.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> No it will not, I checked. The time is the same for 2GB and 32GB guests-
> >>>> the delay is caused by clearing the small DMA window which is small by
> >>>> the space mapped (1GB) but quite huge in TCEs as it uses 4K pages; and
> >>>> for DDW window + emulated devices the IOMMU page size will be 2M/16M/1G
> >>>> (depends on the system) so the number of TCEs is much smaller.
> >>>
> >>> I cant get your results.  What changes did you make to get it?
> >>
> >>
> >> Get what? I passed "-m 2G" and "-m 32G", got the same time - 13s spent
> >> in clearing the default window and the huge window took a fraction of a
> >> second to create and map.
> > 
> > Is this if we disable FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE in the guest and force the use
> > of H_PUT_TCE everywhere?
> 
> 
> Yes. Well, for the DDW case FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE is ignored but even when
> fixed (I have it in my local branch), this does not make a difference.
> 
> 
> > 
> > In theory couldn't we leave FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE in place so that
> > iommu_table_clear() can still use H_STUFF_TCE (which I guess is basically
> > instant),
> 
> PAPR/LoPAPR "conveniently" do not describe what hcall-multi-tce does
> exactly. But I am pretty sure the idea is that either both H_STUFF_TCE
> and H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT are present or neither.

That was my interpretation (or maybe I just went by what your
implementation did :), but just because they are available doesn't mean
the guest has to use them. I agree it's ugly to condition it on
is_secure_guest(), but to me that seems better than sharing memory
uncessarily, or potentially leaving stale mappings into default IOMMU.

Not sure if that are other alternatives though.

> 
> 
> > and then force H_PUT_TCE for new mappings via something like:
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> > index 6ba081dd61c9..85d092baf17d 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> > @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(struct iommu_table *tbl, long tcenum,
> >         unsigned long flags;
> >  
> >         if ((npages == 1) || !firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE)) {
> > +       if ((npages == 1) || !firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE) || is_secure_guest()) {
> 
> 
> Nobody (including myself) seems to like the idea of having
> is_secure_guest() all over the place.
> 
> And with KVM acceleration enabled, it is pretty fast anyway. Just now we
> do not have H_PUT_TCE in KVM/UV for secure guests but we will have to
> fix this for secure PCI passhtrough anyway.
> 
> 
> >                 return tce_build_pSeriesLP(tbl, tcenum, npages, uaddr,
> >                                            direction, attrs);
> >         }
> > 
> > That seems like it would avoid the extra 13s.
> 
> Or move around iommu_table_clear() which imho is just the right thing to do.
> 
> 
> > If we take the additional step of only mapping SWIOTLB range in
> > enable_ddw() for is_secure_guest() that might further improve things
> > (though the bigger motivation with that is the extra isolation it would
> > grant us for stuff behind the IOMMU, since it apparently doesn't affect
> > boot-time all that much)
> 
> 
> Sure, we just need to confirm how many of these swiotlb banks we are
> going to have (just one or many and at what location). Thanks,
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >>
> >>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> -global
> >>>>>> spapr-pci-host-bridge.dma_win_size=0x4000000
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This option, speeds it up tremendously.  But than should this option be
> >>>>> enabled in qemu by default?  only for secure VMs? for both VMs?
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> As discussed in slack, by default we do not need to clear the entire TCE
> >>>> table and we only have to map swiotlb buffer using the small window. It
> >>>> is a guest kernel change only. Thanks,
> >>>
> >>> Can you tell me what code you are talking about here.  Where is the TCE
> >>> table getting cleared? What code needs to be changed to not clear it?
> >>
> >>
> >> pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP()
> >>         iommu_init_table()
> >>                 iommu_table_clear()
> >>                         for () tbl->it_ops->get()
> >>
> >> We do not really need to clear it there, we only need it for VFIO with
> >> IOMMU SPAPR TCE v1 which reuses these tables but there are
> >> iommu_take_ownership/iommu_release_ownership to clear these tables. I'll
> >> send a patch for this.
> > 
> > 
> >>
> >>
> >>> Is the code in tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(), the one that does the clear
> >>> aswell?
> >>
> >>
> >> This one does not need to clear TCEs as this creates a window of known
> >> size and maps it all.
> >>
> >> Well, actually, it only maps actual guest RAM, if there are gaps in RAM,
> >> then TCEs for the gaps will have what hypervisor had there (which is
> >> zeroes, qemu/kvm clears it anyway).
> >>
> >>
> >>> But before I close, you have not told me clearly, what is the problem
> >>> with;  'share the page, make the H_PUT_INDIRECT_TCE hcall, unshare the page'.
> >>
> >> Between share and unshare you have a (tiny) window of opportunity to
> >> attack the guest. No, I do not know how exactly.
> >>
> >> For example, the hypervisor does a lot of PHB+PCI hotplug-unplug with
> >> 64bit devices - each time this will create a huge window which will
> >> share/unshare the same page.  No, I do not know how exactly how this can
> >> be exploited either, we cannot rely of what you or myself know today. My
> >> point is that we should not be sharing pages at all unless we really
> >> really have to, and this does not seem to be the case.
> >>
> >> But since this seems to an acceptable compromise anyway,
> >>
> >> Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@...abs.ru>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Remember this is the same page that is earmarked for doing
> >>> H_PUT_INDIRECT_TCE, not by my patch, but its already earmarked by the
> >>> existing code. So it not some random buffer that is picked. Second 
> >>> this page is temporarily shared and unshared, it does not stay shared
> >>> for life.  It does not slow the boot. it does not need any
> >>> special command line options on the qemu.
> >>>> Shared pages technology was put in place, exactly for the purpose of
> >>> sharing data with the hypervisor.  We are using this technology exactly
> >>> for that purpose.  And finally I agreed with your concern of having
> >>> shared pages staying around.  Hence i addressed that concern, by
> >>> unsharing the page.  At this point, I fail to understand your concern.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> -- 
> >> Alexey
> 
> -- 
> Alexey

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