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Message-ID: <fd6ffb43-ed43-14cd-b286-6ab4b199155b@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:15:26 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com,
joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com, rodrigo.vivi@...el.com,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com, benh@...nel.crashing.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, serge@...lyn.com,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org" <linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org>,
intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org, bgregg@...flix.com,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
process
Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 &&
+ !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 &&
+ !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 &&
+ !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EPERM;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
--
2.20.1
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