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Message-ID: <d09adcce-3004-bc3f-b9d1-69b57107b468@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 18:35:03 +0530
From: "Thomas, Rijo-john" <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>
To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc: tee-dev@...ts.linaro.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Nimesh Easow <Nimesh.Easow@....com>,
Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Gary Hook <gary.hook@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] TEE driver for AMD APUs
+Herbert
Hi Jens,
On 16/12/19 6:09 pm, Jens Wiklander wrote:
> Hi Rijo,
>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 06:04:24PM +0530, Thomas, Rijo-john wrote:
>> Hi Jens,
>>
>> Please let me know if there are any comments for this patch series. I
>> shall address them, if any, and post for next review.
>
> This looks good, I have no further comments.
>
> How do you intend to upstream this? There's the dependency towards "Add
> TEE interface support to AMD Secure Processor driver"
> (https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flkml.org%2Flkml%2F2019%2F12%2F4%2F42&data=02%7C01%7CRijo-john.Thomas%40amd.com%7C3be32c79103640faefdc08d78224f703%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637120967585713342&sdata=I2lQNxu%2BBeIrL3Yk09IOYlUGsxWeCmLJhCcFuyqSJkA%3D&reserved=0) to take into account too.
Thanks! If you are okay, can you give an Acked-by so that I can ask the crypto
subsystem maintainer to pull these patches as well.
Thanks,
Rijo
>
> Thanks,
> Jens
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Rijo
>>
>> On 06/12/19 10:48 am, Rijo Thomas wrote:
>>> This patch series introduces Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver
>>> for AMD APU enabled systems. The TEE is a secure area of a processor which
>>> ensures that sensitive data is stored, processed and protected in an
>>> isolated and trusted environment. The AMD Secure Processor is a dedicated
>>> processor which provides TEE to enable HW platform security. It offers
>>> protection against software attacks generated in Rich Operating
>>> System (Rich OS) such as Linux running on x86. The AMD-TEE Trusted OS
>>> running on AMD Secure Processor allows loading and execution of security
>>> sensitive applications called Trusted Applications (TAs). An example of
>>> a TA would be a DRM (Digital Rights Management) TA written to enforce
>>> content protection.
>>>
>>> Linux already provides a tee subsystem, which is described in [1]. The tee
>>> subsystem provides a generic TEE ioctl interface which can be used by user
>>> space to talk to a TEE driver. AMD-TEE driver registers with tee subsystem
>>> and implements tee function callbacks in an AMD platform specific manner.
>>>
>>> The following TEE commands are recognized by AMD-TEE Trusted OS:
>>> 1. TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA : Load Trusted Application (TA) binary into TEE
>>> environment
>>> 2. TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA : Unload TA binary from TEE environment
>>> 3. TEE_CMD_ID_OPEN_SESSION : Open session with loaded TA
>>> 4. TEE_CMD_ID_CLOSE_SESSION : Close session with loaded TA
>>> 5. TEE_CMD_ID_INVOKE_CMD : Invoke a command with loaded TA
>>> 6. TEE_CMD_ID_MAP_SHARED_MEM : Map shared memory
>>> 7. TEE_CMD_ID_UNMAP_SHARED_MEM : Unmap shared memory
>>>
>>> Each command has its own payload format. The AMD-TEE driver creates a
>>> command buffer payload for submission to AMD-TEE Trusted OS.
>>>
>>> This patch series has a dependency on another patch set titled - Add TEE
>>> interface support to AMD Secure Processor driver.
>>> Link: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flkml.org%2Flkml%2F2019%2F12%2F4%2F42&data=02%7C01%7CRijo-john.Thomas%40amd.com%7C3be32c79103640faefdc08d78224f703%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637120967585713342&sdata=I2lQNxu%2BBeIrL3Yk09IOYlUGsxWeCmLJhCcFuyqSJkA%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> v3:
>>> * Updated [1] with driver details
>>>
>>> v2:
>>> * Added a helper API in AMD Secure Processor driver, which can be
>>> called by AMD-TEE driver during module init to check if TEE is
>>> present on the device
>>> * Added proper checks for parameter attribute variable
>>> * Used tee_shm_pool_alloc() to allocate struct tee_shm_pool data structure
>>> * Removed all references to tee_private.h header file in driver code,
>>> except for the file drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c. The driver loads TA binary
>>> by calling request_firmware(), which takes struct device* as one of its
>>> arguments. The device 'dev' field is part of struct tee_device, defined
>>> in tee_private.h
>>>
>>> [1] https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kernel.org%2Fdoc%2FDocumentation%2Ftee.txt&data=02%7C01%7CRijo-john.Thomas%40amd.com%7C3be32c79103640faefdc08d78224f703%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637120967585713342&sdata=3nmaMDGsdbqRdR3ocM0xoEFsNRbd2IgUj6tvCKJhk2w%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> Rijo Thomas (4):
>>> tee: allow compilation of tee subsystem for AMD CPUs
>>> tee: add AMD-TEE driver
>>> tee: amdtee: check TEE status during driver initialization
>>> Documentation: tee: add AMD-TEE driver details
>>>
>>> Documentation/tee.txt | 81 ++++++
>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/tee-dev.c | 11 +
>>> drivers/tee/Kconfig | 4 +-
>>> drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 +
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/Kconfig | 8 +
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/Makefile | 5 +
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h | 183 +++++++++++++
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h | 159 +++++++++++
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c | 373 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 516 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> drivers/tee/amdtee/shm_pool.c | 93 +++++++
>>> include/linux/psp-tee.h | 18 ++
>>> include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 1 +
>>> 13 files changed, 1451 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/Kconfig
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/Makefile
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c
>>> create mode 100644 drivers/tee/amdtee/shm_pool.c
>>>
>>> --
>>> 1.9.1
>>>
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