linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: nofpsmid: Handle TIF_FOREIGN

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Date:   Wed, 18 Dec 2019 11:42:41 +0000
From:   Suzuki Kuruppassery Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
To:     Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        will@...nel.org, mark.rutland@....com, dave.martin@....com,
        catalin.marinas@....com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
        christoffer.dall@....com, Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: nofpsmid: Handle TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag
 cleanly

Hi Marc,

On 17/12/2019 19:05, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Hi Suzuki,
> 
> On 2019-12-17 18:34, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>> We detect the absence of FP/SIMD after an incapable CPU is brought up,
>> and by then we have kernel threads running already with
>> TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE set
>> which could be set for early userspace applications (e.g, modprobe 
>> triggered
>> from initramfs) and init. This could cause the applications to loop
>> forever in
>> do_nofity_resume() as we never clear the TIF flag, once we now know that
>> we don't support FP.
>>
>> Fix this by making sure that we clear the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag
>> for tasks which may have them set, as we would have done in the normal
>> case, but avoiding touching the hardware state (since we don't support 
>> any).
>>
>> Also to make sure we handle the cases seemlessly we categorise the
>> helper functions to two :
>>  1) Helpers for common core code, which calls into take appropriate
>>     actions without knowing the current FPSIMD state of the CPU/task.
>>
>>     e.g fpsimd_restore_current_state(), fpsimd_flush_task_state(),
>>         fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state().
>>
>>     We bail out early for these functions, taking any appropriate actions
>>     (e.g, clearing the TIF flag) where necessary to hide the handling
>>     from core code.
>>
>>  2) Helpers used when the presence of FP/SIMD is apparent.
>>     i.e, save/restore the FP/SIMD register state, modify the CPU/task
>>     FP/SIMD state.
>>     e.g,
>>
>>     fpsimd_save(), task_fpsimd_load() - save/restore task FP/SIMD 
>> registers
>>
>>     fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu()  \
>>                                 - Update the "state" metadata for 
>> CPU/task.
>>     fpsimd_bind_state_to_cpu() /
>>
>>     fpsimd_update_current_state() - Update the fp/simd state for the 
>> current
>>                                     task from memory.
>>
>>     These must not be called in the absence of FP/SIMD. Put in a WARNING
>>     to make sure they are not invoked in the absence of FP/SIMD.
>>
>> KVM also uses the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag to manage the FP/SIMD state
>> on the CPU. However, without FP/SIMD support we trap all accesses and
>> inject undefined instruction. Thus we should never "load" guest state.
>> Add a sanity check to make sure this is valid.
> 
> Yes, but no, see below.
> 
>>
>> Fixes: 82e0191a1aa11abf ("arm64: Support systems without FP/ASIMD")
>> Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
>> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
> 
> No idea who that guy is. It's a fake! ;-)

Sorry about that, will fix it.

> 
>> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c  | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c |  9 +++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
> 
> [...]
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> index 72fbbd86eb5e..9696ebb5c13a 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> @@ -28,10 +28,19 @@
>>  /* Check whether the FP regs were dirtied while in the host-side run
>> loop: */
>>  static bool __hyp_text update_fp_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>  {
>> +    /*
>> +     * When the system doesn't support FP/SIMD, we cannot rely on
>> +     * the state of _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE. However, we will never
>> +     * set the KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED, as the FP/SIMD accesses always
>> +     * inject an abort into the guest. Thus we always trap the
>> +     * accesses.
>> +     */
>>      if (vcpu->arch.host_thread_info->flags & _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)
>>          vcpu->arch.flags &= ~(KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED |
>>                        KVM_ARM64_FP_HOST);
>>
>> +    WARN_ON(!system_supports_fpsimd() &&
>> +        (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED));
> 
> Careful, this will panic the host if it happens on a !VHE host
> (calling non-inline stuff from a __hyp_text function is usually
> not a good idea).

Ouch! Sorry about that WARN_ON()! I could drop the warning and
make this :

	if (!system_supports_fpsimd() ||
	    (vcpu->arch.host_thread_info->flags & _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE))
		vcpu->arch.flags &= ~(KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED |
				      KVM_ARM64_FP_HOST);

to make sure we never say fp is enabled.

What do you think ?

Cheers
Suzuki