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Message-ID: <d5e27bf5-3cc9-c8bd-5699-71658983054e@arm.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Dec 2019 12:00:27 +0000
From:   Suzuki Kuruppassery Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
To:     Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        will@...nel.org, mark.rutland@....com, dave.martin@....com,
        catalin.marinas@....com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
        christoffer.dall@....com, Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: nofpsmid: Handle TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag
 cleanly

On 18/12/2019 11:56, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 2019-12-18 11:42, Suzuki Kuruppassery Poulose wrote:
>> Hi Marc,
>>
>> On 17/12/2019 19:05, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>>> Hi Suzuki,
>>> On 2019-12-17 18:34, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>>>> We detect the absence of FP/SIMD after an incapable CPU is brought up,
>>>> and by then we have kernel threads running already with
>>>> TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE set
>>>> which could be set for early userspace applications (e.g, modprobe 
>>>> triggered
>>>> from initramfs) and init. This could cause the applications to loop
>>>> forever in
>>>> do_nofity_resume() as we never clear the TIF flag, once we now know 
>>>> that
>>>> we don't support FP.
>>>>
>>>> Fix this by making sure that we clear the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag
>>>> for tasks which may have them set, as we would have done in the normal
>>>> case, but avoiding touching the hardware state (since we don't 
>>>> support any).
>>>>
>>>> Also to make sure we handle the cases seemlessly we categorise the
>>>> helper functions to two :
>>>>  1) Helpers for common core code, which calls into take appropriate
>>>>     actions without knowing the current FPSIMD state of the CPU/task.
>>>>
>>>>     e.g fpsimd_restore_current_state(), fpsimd_flush_task_state(),
>>>>         fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state().
>>>>
>>>>     We bail out early for these functions, taking any appropriate 
>>>> actions
>>>>     (e.g, clearing the TIF flag) where necessary to hide the handling
>>>>     from core code.
>>>>
>>>>  2) Helpers used when the presence of FP/SIMD is apparent.
>>>>     i.e, save/restore the FP/SIMD register state, modify the CPU/task
>>>>     FP/SIMD state.
>>>>     e.g,
>>>>
>>>>     fpsimd_save(), task_fpsimd_load() - save/restore task FP/SIMD 
>>>> registers
>>>>
>>>>     fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu()  \
>>>>                                 - Update the "state" metadata for 
>>>> CPU/task.
>>>>     fpsimd_bind_state_to_cpu() /
>>>>
>>>>     fpsimd_update_current_state() - Update the fp/simd state for the 
>>>> current
>>>>                                     task from memory.
>>>>
>>>>     These must not be called in the absence of FP/SIMD. Put in a 
>>>> WARNING
>>>>     to make sure they are not invoked in the absence of FP/SIMD.
>>>>
>>>> KVM also uses the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag to manage the FP/SIMD state
>>>> on the CPU. However, without FP/SIMD support we trap all accesses and
>>>> inject undefined instruction. Thus we should never "load" guest state.
>>>> Add a sanity check to make sure this is valid.
>>> Yes, but no, see below.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: 82e0191a1aa11abf ("arm64: Support systems without FP/ASIMD")
>>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
>>>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
>>>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
>>>> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
>>> No idea who that guy is. It's a fake! ;-)
>>
>> Sorry about that, will fix it.
>>
>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c  | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>>>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c |  9 +++++++++
>>>>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>>>> index 72fbbd86eb5e..9696ebb5c13a 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>>>> @@ -28,10 +28,19 @@
>>>>  /* Check whether the FP regs were dirtied while in the host-side run
>>>> loop: */
>>>>  static bool __hyp_text update_fp_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>  {
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * When the system doesn't support FP/SIMD, we cannot rely on
>>>> +     * the state of _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE. However, we will never
>>>> +     * set the KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED, as the FP/SIMD accesses always
>>>> +     * inject an abort into the guest. Thus we always trap the
>>>> +     * accesses.
>>>> +     */
>>>>      if (vcpu->arch.host_thread_info->flags & _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)
>>>>          vcpu->arch.flags &= ~(KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED |
>>>>                        KVM_ARM64_FP_HOST);
>>>>
>>>> +    WARN_ON(!system_supports_fpsimd() &&
>>>> +        (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED));
>>> Careful, this will panic the host if it happens on a !VHE host
>>> (calling non-inline stuff from a __hyp_text function is usually
>>> not a good idea).
>>
>> Ouch! Sorry about that WARN_ON()! I could drop the warning and
>> make this :
>>
>> if (!system_supports_fpsimd() ||
>>     (vcpu->arch.host_thread_info->flags & _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE))
>>     vcpu->arch.flags &= ~(KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED |
>>                   KVM_ARM64_FP_HOST);
>>
>> to make sure we never say fp is enabled.
>>
>> What do you think ?
> 
> Sure, that would work. I can't really see how KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED

Thanks I have fixed this locally now.

> would get set though. But it probably doesn't matter (WTF is going

Right. That cannot be set to begin with, as the first access to FP/SIMD
injects an abort back to the guest, which is why I added a WARN() to
begin with.

Just wanted to be extra safe.

> to run KVM with such broken HW?), and better safe than sorry.

Right, with no COMPAT KVM support it is really hard to get this far.

Cheers
Suzuki

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