linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore

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Message-ID: <20191220201621.riyrptl5vwdukztc@linutronix.de>
Date:   Fri, 20 Dec 2019 21:16:21 +0100
From:   Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when
 __fpu_restore_sig() fails

On 2019-12-19 09:40:06 [-0800], Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-12-19 at 18:16 +0100, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior wrote:
> > On 2019-12-19 08:44:08 [-0800], Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > Yes, this works.  But then everywhere that calls copy_*_to_xregs_*() etc. needs to be checked.
> > > Are there other alternatives?
> > 
> > I don't like the big hammer approach of your very much. It might make
> > all it "correct" but then it might lead to more "invalids" then needed.
> > It also required to export the symbol which I would like to avoid.
> 
> Copying to registers invalids current fpregs context.  It might not cause
> extra register loading, because registers are in fact already invalidated
> and any task owning the context needs to reload anyway.  Setting
> fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx is only to let the rest of the kernel know the
> fact that already happened.
> 
> But, I agree with you the patch does look biggish.

Now that I looked at it:
All kernel loads don't fail. If they fail we end up in the handler and
restore to init-state. So no need to reset `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' in this
case. The variable is actually set to task's FPU state so resetting is
not required.
fpu__save() invokes copy_kernel_to_fpregs() (on older boxes) and by
resetting `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' we would load it twice (in fpu__save()
and on return to userland).

So far I can tell, the only problematic case is the signal code because
here the state restore *may* fail and we *may* do it in two steps. The
error happens only if both `may' are true.

> > So if this patch works for you and you don't find anything else where it
> > falls apart then I will audit tomorrow all callers which got the
> > "invalidator" added and check for that angle.
> 
> Yes, that works for me.  Also, most of these call sites are under fpregs_lock(),
> and we could use __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state().
> I was also thinking maybe add warnings when any new code re-introduces the issue,
> but not sure where to add that.  Do you think that is needed?

I was thinking about it. So the `read-FPU-state' function must be
invoked within the fpregs_lock() section. This could be easily
enforced. At fpregs_unlock() time `fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx' must be NULL or
pointing to task's FPU.
My brain is fried for today so I'm sure if this is a sane approach. But
it might be a start.

> Thanks,
> Yu-cheng

Sebastian