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Message-Id: <20191227021133.11993-8-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2019 10:11:33 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
sean.j.christopherson@...el.com
Cc: yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 7/7] KVM: X86: Add user-space access interface for CET MSRs
There're two different places storing Guest CET states, states
managed with XSAVES/XRSTORS, as restored/saved
in previous patch, can be read/write directly from/to the MSRs.
For those stored in VMCS fields, they're access via vmcs_read/
vmcs_write.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++
4 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 64bf379381e4..34140462084f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@
| X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \
| X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \
| X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \
- | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP))
+ | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP \
+ | X86_CR4_CET))
#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 126a31b99823..4414bd110f3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -385,13 +385,14 @@ static inline void do_cpuid_7_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index)
F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) |
F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
- F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/;
+ F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | F(SHSTK) |
+ 0 /*WAITPKG*/;
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
- F(MD_CLEAR);
+ F(MD_CLEAR) | F(IBT);
/* cpuid 7.1.eax */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_1_eax_x86_features =
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 0a75b65d03f0..52ac67604026 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1763,6 +1763,96 @@ static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
return 0;
}
+#define CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_1 0x3
+#define CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_2 (0xF << 6)
+
+static bool cet_ssp_write_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ u64 data = msr->data;
+ u32 high_word = data >> 32;
+
+ if (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu)) {
+ if (data & CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_1)
+ return false;
+ } else if (high_word) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool cet_ctl_write_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ u64 data = msr->data;
+ u32 high_word = data >> 32;
+
+ if (data & CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_2)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) && high_word)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool cet_ssp_access_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ u64 kvm_xss;
+ u32 index = msr->index;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ if (index == MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB)
+ return true;
+
+ kvm_xss = kvm_supported_xss();
+
+ if (index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP) {
+ if (!(kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER))
+ return false;
+ } else if (!(kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool cet_ctl_access_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ u64 kvm_xss;
+ u32 index = msr->index;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ kvm_xss = kvm_supported_xss();
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ return false;
+
+ if (index == MSR_IA32_U_CET) {
+ if (!(kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER))
+ return false;
+ } else if (!(kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
/*
* Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'.
* Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
@@ -1886,6 +1976,26 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
else
msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+ if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ if (!cet_ssp_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
+ if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_info->data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+ if (!cet_ssp_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ rdmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data);
+ break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
@@ -2147,6 +2257,34 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
else
vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+ if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cet_ctl_write_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+ vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
+ if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cet_ctl_write_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+ if (!cet_ssp_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cet_ssp_write_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ wrmsrl(msr_info->index, data);
+ break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 6dbe77365b22..7de6faa6aa51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1186,6 +1186,10 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 12, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 13,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 14, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 15,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 16, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17,
+
+ MSR_IA32_XSS, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
+ MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,
+ MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
};
static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)];
@@ -1468,6 +1472,13 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
* invokes 64-bit SYSENTER.
*/
data = get_canonical(data, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+ case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
+ case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+ return 1;
}
msr.data = data;
--
2.17.2
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