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Message-ID: <CALMp9eQhU5WdDi5h+stS7oCmJSOXrGBhEAGx0mdPvjHV35R9=w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 12:16:00 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>, Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from
Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 12:48 PM Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
> kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
> symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.
>
> Fixes: commit 045a282ca415 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")
>
> Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
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