[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CALMp9eT5HVhtCKOKaBxkaVUVs+uQ908Z2coM3n6j9aMU33=HGw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 12:19:12 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>, Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses from
Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c
On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 12:49 PM Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
> vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
> vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar().
> These functions contain index computations based on the
> (attacker-influenced) segment value.
>
> Fixes: commit 2fb92db1ec08 ("KVM: VMX: Cache vmcs segment fields")
>
> Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists