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Message-Id: <20200107194350.3782-4-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 11:43:49 -0800
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: eric.snowberg@...cle.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com, matthewgarrett@...gle.com,
sashal@...nel.org, jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
Limit measuring keys to those keys being loaded onto a given set of
keyrings only and when the user id (uid) matches if uid is specified
in the policy.
This patch defines a new IMA policy option namely "keyrings=" that
can be used to specify a set of keyrings. If this option is specified
in the policy for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" then only the keys
loaded onto a keyring given in the "keyrings=" option are measured.
If uid is specified in the policy then the key is measured only if
the current user id matches the one specified in the policy.
Added a new parameter namely "keyring" (name of the keyring) to
process_buffer_measurement(). The keyring name is passed to
ima_get_action() to determine the required action.
ima_match_rules() is updated to check keyring in the policy, if
specified, for KEY_CHECK function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad38a ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 10 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 8 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++--
7 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 066d32797500..cd572912c593 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
- [appraise_flag=]
+ [appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Description:
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
signature.
+ keyrings:= list of keyrings
+ (eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid
+ when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK.
template:= name of a defined IMA template type
(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
pcr:= decimal value
@@ -117,3 +120,8 @@ Description:
Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to measure all keys:
measure func=KEY_CHECK
+
+ Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to only measure
+ keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
+
+ measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index fe6c698617bd..f06238e41a7c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -208,7 +208,8 @@ struct modsig;
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr);
+ int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 610759fe63b8..f6bc00914aa5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -169,12 +169,13 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @func: caller identifier
* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
+ * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * | KEXEC_CMDLINE
+ * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
@@ -183,14 +184,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
*/
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
- template_desc);
+ template_desc, keyring);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 300c8d2943c5..a9649b04b9f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
- pcr);
+ pcr, NULL);
}
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index 994d89d58af9..fea2e7dd3b09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -46,7 +46,13 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* parameter to process_buffer_measurement() and is set
* in the "eventname" field in ima_event_data for
* the key measurement IMA event.
+ *
+ * The name of the keyring is also passed in the "keyring"
+ * parameter to process_buffer_measurement() to check
+ * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
+ * to the given keyring.
*/
process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
- keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0);
+ keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
+ keyring->description);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9b35db2fc777..2272c3255c7d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
- &template_desc);
+ &template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -632,12 +632,13 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
* @func: IMA hook
* @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
+ * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
*
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr)
+ int pcr, const char *keyring)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
@@ -668,7 +669,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template);
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
@@ -721,7 +722,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
{
if (buf && size != 0)
process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
- KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0);
+ KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3f3928b3db99..7667ca546ce9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
+ char *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
@@ -356,6 +357,50 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
+/**
+ * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
+ *
+ * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
+ const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ char *keyrings, *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr;
+ bool matched = false;
+
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!rule->keyrings)
+ return true;
+
+ if (!keyring)
+ return false;
+
+ keyrings = kstrdup(rule->keyrings, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!keyrings)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below:
+ * keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm
+ */
+ keyrings_ptr = keyrings;
+ while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) {
+ if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) {
+ matched = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ kfree(keyrings);
+
+ return matched;
+}
+
/**
* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -364,18 +409,23 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ const char *keyring)
{
int i;
if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func))
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
+ if (func == KEY_CHECK)
+ return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
return true;
+ }
return false;
}
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
@@ -479,6 +529,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
+ * @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy.
+ * keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK.
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -489,7 +541,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -503,7 +556,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ keyring))
continue;
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
--
2.17.1
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