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Message-ID: <e2b183a8-ffea-2df4-2929-a7f67cba8a81@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 07:57:18 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory
encryption is enabled
On 1/7/20 6:04 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 07, 2020 at 05:51:51PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 1/7/20 5:31 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> AIUI, using phys_bits=48, then the standard scenario is Cbit=47 and some
>>> additional bits 46:M are reserved. Applying that logic to phys_bits=52,
>>> then Cbit=51 and bits 50:M are reserved, so there's a collision but it's
>>
>> There's no requirement that the C-bit correspond to phys_bits. So, for
>> example, you can have C-bit=51 and phys_bits=48 and so 47:M are reserved.
>
> But then using blindly using x86_phys_bits would break if the PA bits
> aren't reduced, e.g. C-bit=47 and phys_bits=47. AFAICT, there's no
> requirement that there be reduced PA bits when there is a C-bit. I'm
> guessing there aren't plans to ship such CPUs, but I don't see anything
> in the APM to prevent such a scenario.
I can add in extra checks to see if C-bit == phys_bits, etc. and adjust
with appropriate limit checking. It's in the init path, so the extra
checks aren't a big deal.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Maybe the least painful approach would be to go with a version of this
> patch and add a check that there are indeeded reserved/reduced bits?
> Probably with a WARN_ON_ONCE if the check fails.
>
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