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Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 17:07:13 +0100 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com>, "joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com" <joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com>, "rodrigo.vivi@...el.com" <rodrigo.vivi@...el.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>, Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, "james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com" <james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Robert Richter <rric@...nel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>, Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...ux.intel.com>, Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@...el.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, "selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org>, "bpf@...r.kernel.org" <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org>, "linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>, "linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org" <linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, oprofile-list@...ts.sf.net Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:25:35PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged > processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events > subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but > CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged > with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com> > --- > include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- > kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- > 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h > index 34c7c6910026..f46acd69425f 100644 > --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h > +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h > @@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) > > static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) > { > - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); > @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) > > static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) > { > - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); > @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) > > static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) > { > - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable()) > return -EPERM; > > return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT); These are OK I suppose. > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c > index 059ee7116008..d9db414f2197 100644 > --- a/kernel/events/core.c > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c > @@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) > if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type) > return -ENOENT; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > /* This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does not allow creation of kprobes. > @@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) > if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type) > return -ENOENT; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > /* Idem, I presume. > @@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, > } > > if (attr.namespaces) { > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > } And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either. So yeah, I suppose that works.
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