linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Thu, 9 Jan 2020 20:11:48 +0100
From:   KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>
To:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...omium.org>,
        Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
        Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...omium.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@...rochip.com>,
        Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@...ronome.com>,
        Andrey Ignatov <rdna@...com>, Joe Stringer <joe@...d.net.nz>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)

On 10-Jan 05:11, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> 
> > The cover letter subject line and the Kconfig help text refer to it as a
> > BPF-based "MAC and Audit policy".  It has an enforce config option that
> > enables the bpf programs to deny access, providing access control. IIRC, in
> > the earlier discussion threads, the BPF maintainers suggested that Smack and
> > other LSMs could be entirely re-implemented via it in the future, and that
> > such an implementation would be more optimal.
> 
> In this case, the eBPF code is similar to a kernel module, rather than a 
> loadable policy file.  It's a loadable mechanism, rather than a policy, in 
> my view.
> 
> This would be similar to the difference between iptables rules and 
> loadable eBPF networking code.  I'd be interested to know how the 
> eBPF networking scenarios are handled wrt kernel ABI.
> 
> 
> > Again, not arguing for or against, but wondering if people fully understand
> > the implications.  If it ends up being useful, people will build access
> > control systems with it, and it directly exposes a lot of kernel internals to
> > userspace.  There was a lot of concern originally about the LSM hook interface
> > becoming a stable ABI and/or about it being misused.  Exposing that interface
> > along with every kernel data structure exposed through it to userspace seems
> > like a major leap.
> 
> Agreed this is a leap, although I'm not sure I'd characterize it as 
> exposure to userspace -- it allows dynamic extension of the LSM API from 
> userland, but the code is executed in the kernel.
> 
> KP: One thing I'd like to understand better is the attack surface 
> introduced by this.  IIUC, the BTF fields are read only, so the eBPF code 
> should not be able to modify any LSM parameters, correct?
> 

That's correct, the verifier does not allow writes to BTF types:

from kernel/bpf/verifier.c:

        case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
	if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
	        verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

We can also add additional checks on top of those added by the
verifier using the verifier_ops that each BPF program type can define. 

- KP

> 
> >  Even if the mainline kernel doesn't worry about any kind
> > of stable interface guarantees for it, the distros might be forced to provide
> > some kABI guarantees for it to appease ISVs and users...
> 
> How is this handled currently for other eBPF use-cases?
> 
> -- 
> James Morris
> <jmorris@...ei.org>
>