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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 07:41:48 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>
Cc: kbuild-all@...ts.01.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
"Peter, Matthias" <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
Roman Drahtmueller <draht@...altsekun.de>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...ia.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v27 01/12] Linux Random Number Generator
Am Donnerstag, 16. Januar 2020, 07:09:51 CET schrieb kbuild test robot:
Hi kbuild,
> Hi "Stephan,
>
> Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
>
> [auto build test WARNING on char-misc/char-misc-testing]
> [also build test WARNING on cryptodev/master crypto/master v5.5-rc6
> next-20200110] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop
> us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base'
> option to specify the base tree in git format-patch, please see
> https://stackoverflow.com/a/37406982]
This patch requires the presence of patch
75551dbf112c992bc6c99a972990b3f272247e23 from Ted Tso's kernel tree as
documented in patch 0/12.
I am not sure how to document it for the kbuild system.
>
> url:
> https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stephan-M-ller/dev-random-a-new-ap
> proach-with-full-SP800-90B/20200110-084934 base:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
> 68faa679b8be1a74e6663c21c3a9d25d32f1c079 reproduce:
> # apt-get install sparse
> # sparse version: v0.6.1-130-g1a803e7a-dirty
> make ARCH=x86_64 allmodconfig
> make C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__'
>
> If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag
> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>
>
>
> sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:455:16: sparse: sparse: incorrect
> >> type in return expression (different base types)
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:455:16: sparse: expected unsigned
> >> int drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:455:16: sparse: got
> >> restricted __poll_t [assigned] [usertype] mask
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:586:18: sparse: sparse: incorrect
> >> type in initializer (different base types)
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:586:18: sparse: expected
> >> restricted __poll_t ( *poll )( ... )
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:586:18: sparse: got unsigned int
> >> ( * )( ... )
> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:605:49: sparse: sparse: undefined
> identifier 'GRND_INSECURE' drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:613:15:
> sparse: sparse: undefined identifier 'GRND_INSECURE'
> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:613:47: sparse: sparse: undefined
> identifier 'GRND_INSECURE' drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c:619:21:
> sparse: sparse: undefined identifier 'GRND_INSECURE' --
> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drng.c:378:6: sparse: sparse: symbol 'lrng_reset'
> was not declared. Should it be static?
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h:235:39: sparse: sparse: context
> >> imbalance in 'lrng_drng_inject' - unexpected unlock
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h:235:39: sparse: sparse: context
> >> imbalance in 'lrng_drng_seed' - unexpected unlock
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h:235:39: sparse: sparse: context
> >> imbalance in 'lrng_drng_get' - unexpected unlock
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h:235:39: sparse: sparse: context
> >> imbalance in 'lrng_drngs_init_cc20' - unexpected unlock
> >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h:235:39: sparse: sparse: context
> >> imbalance in '_lrng_reset' - unexpected unlock
> vim +455 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
>
> 442
> 443 static unsigned int lrng_random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table
> *wait) 444 {
> 445 __poll_t mask;
> 446
> 447 poll_wait(file, &lrng_init_wait, wait);
> 448 poll_wait(file, &lrng_write_wait, wait);
> 449 mask = 0;
> 450 if (lrng_state_operational())
> 451 mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
> 452 if (lrng_need_entropy() ||
> 453 lrng_state_exseed_allow(lrng_noise_source_user))
> 454 mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
>
> > 455 return mask;
>
> 456 }
> 457
> 458 static ssize_t lrng_drng_write_common(const char __user *buffer,
> size_t count, 459 u32
entropy_bits)
> 460 {
> 461 ssize_t ret = 0;
> 462 u8 buf[64] __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
> 463 const char __user *p = buffer;
> 464 u32 orig_entropy_bits = entropy_bits;
> 465
> 466 if (!lrng_get_available())
> 467 return -EAGAIN;
> 468
> 469 count = min_t(size_t, count, INT_MAX);
> 470 while (count > 0) {
> 471 size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, count, sizeof(buf));
> 472 u32 ent = min_t(u32, bytes<<3, entropy_bits);
> 473
> 474 if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
> 475 return -EFAULT;
> 476 /* Inject data into entropy pool */
> 477 lrng_pool_lfsr(buf, bytes);
> 478 lrng_pool_add_entropy(ent);
> 479
> 480 count -= bytes;
> 481 p += bytes;
> 482 ret += bytes;
> 483 entropy_bits -= ent;
> 484
> 485 cond_resched();
> 486 }
> 487
> 488 /* Force reseed of DRNG during next data request. */
> 489 if (!orig_entropy_bits)
> 490 lrng_drng_force_reseed();
> 491
> 492 return ret;
> 493 }
> 494
> 495 static ssize_t lrng_drng_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> 496 size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
> 497 {
> 498 if (!lrng_state_min_seeded())
> 499 pr_notice_ratelimited("%s - use of insufficiently
seeded DRNG "
> 500 "(%zu bytes read)\n", current-
>comm,
> 501 nbytes);
> 502 else if (!lrng_state_operational())
> 503 pr_debug_ratelimited("%s - use of not fully seeded
DRNG (%zu "
> 504 "bytes read)\n", current->comm,
nbytes);
> 505
> 506 return lrng_read_common(buf, nbytes);
> 507 }
> 508
> 509 static ssize_t lrng_drng_write(struct file *file, const char __user
> *buffer, 510 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> 511 {
> 512 return lrng_drng_write_common(buffer, count, 0);
> 513 }
> 514
> 515 static long lrng_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned
> long arg) 516 {
> 517 int size, ent_count_bits;
> 518 int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
> 519
> 520 switch (cmd) {
> 521 case RNDGETENTCNT:
> 522 ent_count_bits = lrng_avail_entropy();
> 523 if (put_user(ent_count_bits, p))
> 524 return -EFAULT;
> 525 return 0;
> 526 case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
> 527 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> 528 return -EPERM;
> 529 if (get_user(ent_count_bits, p))
> 530 return -EFAULT;
> 531 ent_count_bits = (int)lrng_avail_entropy() +
ent_count_bits;
> 532 if (ent_count_bits < 0)
> 533 ent_count_bits = 0;
> 534 if (ent_count_bits > LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS)
> 535 ent_count_bits = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS;
> 536 lrng_pool_set_entropy(ent_count_bits);
> 537 return 0;
> 538 case RNDADDENTROPY:
> 539 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> 540 return -EPERM;
> 541 if (get_user(ent_count_bits, p++))
> 542 return -EFAULT;
> 543 if (ent_count_bits < 0)
> 544 return -EINVAL;
> 545 if (get_user(size, p++))
> 546 return -EFAULT;
> 547 if (size < 0)
> 548 return -EINVAL;
> 549 lrng_state_exseed_set(lrng_noise_source_user, false);
> 550 /* there cannot be more entropy than data */
> 551 ent_count_bits = min(ent_count_bits, size<<3);
> 552 return lrng_drng_write_common((const char __user *)p,
size,
> 553 ent_count_bits);
> 554 case RNDZAPENTCNT:
> 555 case RNDCLEARPOOL:
> 556 /* Clear the entropy pool counter. */
> 557 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> 558 return -EPERM;
> 559 lrng_pool_set_entropy(0);
> 560 return 0;
> 561 case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
> 562 /*
> 563 * We leave the capability check here since it is
present
> 564 * in the upstream's RNG implementation. Yet, user
space
> 565 * can trigger a reseed as easy as writing into /dev/
random
> 566 * or /dev/urandom where no privilege is needed.
> 567 */
> 568 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> 569 return -EPERM;
> 570 /* Force a reseed of all DRNGs */
> 571 lrng_drng_force_reseed();
> 572 return 0;
> 573 default:
> 574 return -EINVAL;
> 575 }
> 576 }
> 577
> 578 static int lrng_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
> 579 {
> 580 return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync);
> 581 }
> 582
> 583 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
> 584 .read = lrng_drng_read_block,
> 585 .write = lrng_drng_write,
>
> > 586 .poll = lrng_random_poll,
>
> 587 .unlocked_ioctl = lrng_ioctl,
> 588 .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
> 589 .fasync = lrng_fasync,
> 590 .llseek = noop_llseek,
> 591 };
> 592
>
> ---
> 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology
> Center https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org Intel
> Corporation
Ciao
Stephan
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