[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <4c91a53f-0124-0816-917d-a8cb232dc6a1@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:29:45 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com" <joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@...el.com" <rodrigo.vivi@...el.com>,
"benh@...nel.crashing.org" <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
"james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Robert Richter <rric@...nel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org>,
"linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
"linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org" <linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org>,
oprofile-list@...ts.sf.net
Subject: [PATCH v5 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON
privileged process
Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly,
without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operations more secure.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index e5ef4ae9edb5..334f1d71ebb1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)
u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.20.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists