| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <CANpmjNMZpLfNKLOs7JVxP-S7oWbkvyg=bt=uYGU30bMZXYtUHA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 16:05:42 +0100
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>,
Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, cyphar@...har.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] copy_to_user, copy_from_user: Use generic instrumented.h
On Mon, 20 Jan 2020 at 15:52, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 3:19 PM Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > This replaces the KASAN instrumentation with generic instrumentation,
> > implicitly adding KCSAN instrumentation support.
> >
> > For KASAN no functional change is intended.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/uaccess.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> > lib/usercopy.c | 14 ++++++++-----
> > 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > index 67f016010aad..d3f2d9a8cae3 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
> > #ifndef __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
> > #define __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
> >
> > +#include <linux/instrumented.h>
> > #include <linux/sched.h>
> > #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> > -#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
> >
> > #define uaccess_kernel() segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)
> >
> > @@ -58,18 +58,26 @@
> > static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> > __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > - kasan_check_write(to, n);
> > + unsigned long res;
> > +
> > check_object_size(to, n, false);
> > - return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_pre(to, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_post(to, n, res);
> > + return res;
> > }
>
> There is also something called strncpy_from_user() that has kasan
> instrumentation now:
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.5-rc6/source/lib/strncpy_from_user.c#L117
Yes, however, I think it's a special case for KASAN. The
implementation is already instrumented by the compiler. In the
original commit it says (1771c6e1a567e):
"Note: Unlike others strncpy_from_user() is written mostly in C and KASAN
sees memory accesses in it. However, it makes sense to add explicit
check for all @count bytes that *potentially* could be written to the
kernel."
I don't think we want unconditional double-instrumentation here. Let
me know if you think otherwise.
Thanks,
-- Marco
> > static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> > __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > + unsigned long res;
> > +
> > might_fault();
> > - kasan_check_write(to, n);
> > check_object_size(to, n, false);
> > - return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_pre(to, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_post(to, n, res);
> > + return res;
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -88,18 +96,26 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> > __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > - kasan_check_read(from, n);
> > + unsigned long res;
> > +
> > check_object_size(from, n, true);
> > - return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_pre(from, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_post(from, n, res);
> > + return res;
> > }
> >
> > static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
> > __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > + unsigned long res;
> > +
> > might_fault();
> > - kasan_check_read(from, n);
> > check_object_size(from, n, true);
> > - return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_pre(from, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_post(from, n, res);
> > + return res;
> > }
> >
> > #ifdef INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
> > @@ -109,8 +125,9 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > unsigned long res = n;
> > might_fault();
> > if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
> > - kasan_check_write(to, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_pre(to, n);
> > res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_post(to, n, res);
> > }
> > if (unlikely(res))
> > memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
> > @@ -125,12 +142,15 @@ _copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long);
> > static inline __must_check unsigned long
> > _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > + unsigned long res = n;
> > +
> > might_fault();
> > if (access_ok(to, n)) {
> > - kasan_check_read(from, n);
> > - n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_pre(from, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_post(from, n, res);
> > }
> > - return n;
> > + return res;
> > }
> > #else
> > extern __must_check unsigned long
> > diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c
> > index cbb4d9ec00f2..1c20d4423b86 100644
> > --- a/lib/usercopy.c
> > +++ b/lib/usercopy.c
> > @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
> > // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > -#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <linux/bitops.h>
> > +#include <linux/instrumented.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >
> > /* out-of-line parts */
> >
> > @@ -10,8 +11,9 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n
> > unsigned long res = n;
> > might_fault();
> > if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
> > - kasan_check_write(to, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_pre(to, n);
> > res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_post(to, n, res);
> > }
> > if (unlikely(res))
> > memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
> > @@ -23,12 +25,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
> > #ifndef INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
> > unsigned long _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > + unsigned long res = n;
> > might_fault();
> > if (likely(access_ok(to, n))) {
> > - kasan_check_read(from, n);
> > - n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_pre(from, n);
> > + res = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_to_user_post(from, n, res);
> > }
> > - return n;
> > + return res;
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_to_user);
> > #endif
> > --
> > 2.25.0.341.g760bfbb309-goog
> >
Powered by blists - more mailing lists