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Message-ID: <f15d9e98-25e9-2031-2db5-6aaa6c78c0eb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 17:40:27 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>,
Roman Kagan <rkagan@...tuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization
out of nested_enable_evmcs()
On 22/01/20 17:29, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Yes, in case we're back to the idea to filter things out in QEMU we can
> do this. What I don't like is that every other userspace which decides
> to enable eVMCS will have to perform the exact same surgery as in case
> it sets allow_unsupported_controls=0 it'll have to know (hardcode) the
> filtering (or KVM_SET_MSRS will fail) and in case it opts for
> allow_unsupported_controls=1 Windows guests just won't boot without the
> filtering.
>
> It seems to be 1:1, eVMCSv1 requires the filter.
Yes, that's the point. It *is* a hack in KVM, but it is generally
preferrable to have an easier API for userspace, if there's only one way
to do it.
Though we could be a bit more "surgical" and only remove
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES---thus minimizing the impact on
non-eVMCS guests. Vitaly, can you prepare a v2 that does that and adds
a huge "hack alert" comment that explains the discussion?
Paolo
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