linux-kernel - [PATCH] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being remapped

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Message-Id: <20200127210014.5207-1-tkjos@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 27 Jan 2020 13:00:14 -0800
From:   Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
To:     tkjos@...gle.com, surenb@...gle.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
        arve@...roid.com, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, maco@...gle.com
Cc:     joel@...lfernandes.org, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being remapped

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>

When ashmem file is being mmapped the resulting vma->vm_file points to the
backing shmem file with the generic fops that do not check ashmem
permissions like fops of ashmem do. Fix that by disallowing mapping
operation for backing shmem file.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 4.4,4.9,4.14,4.18,5.4
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
---
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
index 74d497d39c5a..c6695354b123 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -351,8 +351,23 @@ static inline vm_flags_t calc_vm_may_flags(unsigned long prot)
 	       _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_EXEC,  VM_MAYEXEC);
 }
 
+static int ashmem_vmfile_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	/* do not allow to mmap ashmem backing shmem file directly */
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
+				unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+}
+
 static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	static struct file_operations vmfile_fops;
 	struct ashmem_area *asma = file->private_data;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -393,6 +408,19 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		}
 		vmfile->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK;
 		asma->file = vmfile;
+		/*
+		 * override mmap operation of the vmfile so that it can't be
+		 * remapped which would lead to creation of a new vma with no
+		 * asma permission checks. Have to override get_unmapped_area
+		 * as well to prevent VM_BUG_ON check for f_ops modification.
+		 */
+		if (!vmfile_fops.mmap) {
+			vmfile_fops = *vmfile->f_op;
+			vmfile_fops.mmap = ashmem_vmfile_mmap;
+			vmfile_fops.get_unmapped_area =
+					ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area;
+		}
+		vmfile->f_op = &vmfile_fops;
 	}
 	get_file(asma->file);
 
-- 
2.25.0.341.g760bfbb309-goog