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Message-Id: <20200128135753.205297926@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 14:58:00 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 26/46] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
commit de19055564c8f8f9d366f8db3395836da0b2176c upstream.
For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1845,6 +1845,12 @@
Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
the default is off.
+ kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+ and kernel address spaces.
+ Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+ 0: force disabled
+ 1: force enabled
+
kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
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