[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <56177bc4-441d-36f4-fe73-4e86edf02899@infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 20:52:28 -0800
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, broonie@...nel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-next@...r.kernel.org, mhocko@...e.cz,
mm-commits@...r.kernel.org, sfr@...b.auug.org.au,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: mmotm 2020-01-28-20-05 uploaded (security/security.c)
On 1/28/20 8:06 PM, akpm@...ux-foundation.org wrote:
> The mm-of-the-moment snapshot 2020-01-28-20-05 has been uploaded to
>
> http://www.ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
>
> mmotm-readme.txt says
>
> README for mm-of-the-moment:
>
> http://www.ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
>
> This is a snapshot of my -mm patch queue. Uploaded at random hopefully
> more than once a week.
>
security/security.c contains duplicate lines for <lockdown_reasons> array:
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
* purposes.
*/
const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
* purposes.
*/
const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
Stephen, you might delete half of those for linux-next....
--
~Randy
Powered by blists - more mailing lists