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Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 09:02:08 -0800
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: sjpark@...zon.com
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
andriin@...com, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
aams@...zon.com, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
dola@...zon.com
Subject: Re: Re: Latency spikes occurs from frequent socket connections
On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 4:41 AM <sjpark@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 09:52:43 -0800 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 9:14 AM <sjpark@...zon.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > >
> > > We found races in the kernel code that incur latency spikes. We thus would
> > > like to share our investigations and hear your opinions.
> > >
> > >
> > > Problem Reproduce
> > > =================
> > >
> > > You can reproduce the problem by compiling and running source code of
> > > 'server.c' and 'client.c', which I pasted at the end of this mail, as below:
> > >
> > > $ gcc -o client client.c
> > > $ gcc -o server server.c
> > > $ ./server &
> > > $ ./client
> > > ...
> > > port: 45150, lat: 1005320, avg: 229, nr: 1070811
> > > ...
> > >
> >
> > Thanks for the repro !
>
> My pleasure :)
>
> >
> [...]
> > > Experimental Fix
> > > ----------------
> > >
> > > We confirmed this is the case by logging and some experiments. Further,
> > > because the process of RST/ACK packet would stuck in front of the critical
> > > section while the ACK is being processed inside the critical section in most
> > > case, we add one more check of the RST/ACK inside the critical section. In
> > > detail, it's as below:
> > >
> > > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> > > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> > > @@ -1912,6 +1912,29 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb);
> > > ret = 0;
> > > if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
> > > + // While waiting for the socket lock, the sk may have
> > > + // transitioned to FIN_WAIT2/TIME_WAIT so lookup the
> > > + // twsk and if one is found reprocess the skb
> > > + if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE && !th->syn
> > > + && (th->fin || th->rst))) {
> > > + struct sock *sk2 = __inet_lookup_established(
> > > + net, &tcp_hashinfo,
> > > + iph->saddr, th->source,
> > > + iph->daddr, ntohs(th->dest),
> > > + inet_iif(skb), sdif);
> > > + if (sk2) {
> > > + if (sk2 == sk) {
> > > + sock_put(sk2);
> > > + } else {
> > > + bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> > > + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> > > + if (refcounted) sock_put(sk);
> > > + sk = sk2;
> > > + refcounted = true;
> > > + goto process;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > + }
> >
> >
> > Here are my comments
> >
> >
> > 1) This fixes IPv4 side only, so it can not be a proper fix.
> >
> > 2) TCP is best effort. You can retry the lookup in ehash tables as
> > many times you want, a race can always happen after your last lookup.
> >
> > Normal TCP flows going through a real NIC wont hit this race, since
> > all packets for a given 4-tuple are handled by one cpu (RSS affinity)
> >
> > Basically, the race here is that 2 packets for the same flow are
> > handled by two cpus.
> > Who wins the race is random, we can not enforce a particular order.
>
> Thank you for the comments! I personally agree with your opinions.
>
> >
> > I would rather try to fix the issue more generically, without adding
> > extra lookups as you did, since they might appear
> > to reduce the race, but not completely fix it.
> >
> > For example, the fact that the client side ignores the RST and
> > retransmits a SYN after one second might be something that should be
> > fixed.
>
> I also agree with this direction. It seems detecting this situation and
> adjusting the return value of tcp_timeout_init() to a value much lower than the
> one second would be a straightforward solution. For a test, I modified the
> function to return 1 (4ms for CONFIG_HZ=250) and confirmed the reproducer be
> silent. My following question is, how we can detect this situation in kernel?
> However, I'm unsure how we can distinguish this specific case from other cases,
> as everything is working as normal according to the TCP protocol.
>
> Also, it seems the value is made to be adjustable from the user space using the
> bpf callback, BPF_SOCK_OPS_TIMEOUT_INIT:
>
> BPF_SOCK_OPS_TIMEOUT_INIT, /* Should return SYN-RTO value to use or
> * -1 if default value should be used
> */
>
> Thus, it sounds like you are suggesting to do the detection and adjustment from
> user space. Am I understanding your point? If not, please let me know.
>
No, I was suggesting to implement a mitigation in the kernel :
When in SYN_SENT state, receiving an suspicious ACK should not
simply trigger a RST.
There are multiple ways maybe to address the issue.
1) Abort the SYN_SENT state and let user space receive an error to its
connect() immediately.
2) Instead of a RST, allow the first SYN retransmit to happen immediately
(This is kind of a challenge SYN. Kernel already implements challenge acks)
3) After RST is sent (to hopefully clear the state of the remote),
schedule a SYN rtx in a few ms,
instead of ~ one second.
> >
> >
> >
> > 11:57:14.436259 IP 127.0.0.1.45150 > 127.0.0.1.4242: Flags [S], seq
> > 2560603644, win 65495, options [mss 65495,sackOK,TS val 953760623 ecr
> > 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
> > 11:57:14.436266 IP 127.0.0.1.4242 > 127.0.0.1.45150: Flags [.], ack 5,
> > win 512, options [nop,nop,TS val 953760623 ecr 953759375], length 0
> > 11:57:14.436271 IP 127.0.0.1.45150 > 127.0.0.1.4242: Flags [R], seq
> > 2541101298, win 0, length 0
> > 11:57:15.464613 IP 127.0.0.1.45150 > 127.0.0.1.4242: Flags [S], seq
> > 2560603644, win 65495, options [mss 65495,sackOK,TS val 953761652 ecr
> > 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
> >
> >
> >
> > skb_to_free = sk->sk_rx_skb_cache;
> > > sk->sk_rx_skb_cache = NULL;
> > > ret = tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
> > >
> > > We applied this change to the kernel and confirmed that the latency spikes
> > > disappeared with the reproduce program.
> > >
> > >
> > > More Races
> > > ----------
> > >
> > > Further, the man who found the code path and made the fix found another race
> > > resulted from the commit ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation
> > > for timewait hashdance"). He believes the 'refcount_set()' should be done
> > > before the 'spin_lock()', as it allows others to see the packet in the list but
> > > ignore as the reference count is zero. This race seems much rare than the
> > > above one and thus we have no reproducible test for this, yet.
> >
> > Again, TCP is best effort, seeing the refcount being 0 or not is
> > absolutely fine.
> >
> > The cpu reading the refcnt can always be faster than the cpu setting
> > the refcount to non zero value, no matter how hard you try.
> >
> > The rules are more like : we need to ensure all fields have
> > stable/updated values before allowing other cpus to get the object.
> > Therefore, writing a non zero refcount should happen last.
>
> I personally agree on this, either.
>
>
> Thanks,
> SeongJae Park
>
> >
> > Thanks.
> [...]
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