linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 76/89] airo: Fix possible info leak in AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE

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Message-Id: <20200203161926.221128427@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Feb 2020 16:20:01 +0000
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@...ctive.com>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 76/89] airo: Fix possible info leak in AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>

[ Upstream commit d6bce2137f5d6bb1093e96d2f801479099b28094 ]

The driver for Cisco Aironet 4500 and 4800 series cards (airo.c),
implements AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE in airo_ioctl().

The ioctl handler copies an aironet_ioctl struct from userspace, which
includes a command and a length. Some of the commands are handled in
readrids(), which kmalloc()'s a buffer of RIDSIZE (2048) bytes.

That buffer is then passed to PC4500_readrid(), which has two cases.
The else case does some setup and then reads up to RIDSIZE bytes from
the hardware into the kmalloc()'ed buffer.

Here len == RIDSIZE, pBuf is the kmalloc()'ed buffer:

	// read the rid length field
	bap_read(ai, pBuf, 2, BAP1);
	// length for remaining part of rid
	len = min(len, (int)le16_to_cpu(*(__le16*)pBuf)) - 2;
	...
	// read remainder of the rid
	rc = bap_read(ai, ((__le16*)pBuf)+1, len, BAP1);

PC4500_readrid() then returns to readrids() which does:

	len = comp->len;
	if (copy_to_user(comp->data, iobuf, min(len, (int)RIDSIZE))) {

Where comp->len is the user controlled length field.

So if the "rid length field" returned by the hardware is < 2048, and
the user requests 2048 bytes in comp->len, we will leak the previous
contents of the kmalloc()'ed buffer to userspace.

Fix it by kzalloc()'ing the buffer.

Found by Ilja by code inspection, not tested as I don't have the
required hardware.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@...ctive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
index fc49255bab009..c9ffbdd42e67c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
@@ -7811,7 +7811,7 @@ static int readrids(struct net_device *dev, aironet_ioctl *comp) {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}

-	if ((iobuf = kmalloc(RIDSIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
+	if ((iobuf = kzalloc(RIDSIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;

 	PC4500_readrid(ai,ridcode,iobuf,RIDSIZE, 1);
-- 
2.20.1