linux-kernel - [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <15e3133b-3090-f7e4-f12d-f47c60f8c93d@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 5 Feb 2020 20:35:45 +0300
From:   Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com" <joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Cc:     Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
        Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
        "linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org>,
        oprofile-list@...ts.sf.net
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged
 process


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and
only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1