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Message-ID: <7d6f4210-423f-e454-3910-9f8e17dff1aa@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 16:39:12 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
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Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel
and user space
On 07.02.2020 14:38, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com> writes:
>> On 22.01.2020 17:25, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>> On 22.01.2020 17:07, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>> It keeps the implementation simple and readable. The implementation is more
>>>>> performant in the sense of calling the API - one capable() call for CAP_PERFMON
>>>>> privileged process.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, it bloats audit log for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged and unprivileged processes,
>>>>> but this bloating also advertises and leverages using more secure CAP_PERFMON
>>>>> based approach to use perf_event_open system call.
>>>>
>>>> I can live with that. We just need to document that when you see
>>>> both a CAP_PERFMON and a CAP_SYS_ADMIN audit message for a process,
>>>> try only allowing CAP_PERFMON first and see if that resolves the
>>>> issue. We have a similar issue with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH versus
>>>> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
>>>
>>> perf security [1] document can be updated, at least, to align and document
>>> this audit logging specifics.
>>
>> And I plan to update the document right after this patch set is accepted.
>> Feel free to let me know of the places in the kernel docs that also
>> require update w.r.t CAP_PERFMON extension.
>
> The documentation update wants be part of the patch set and not planned
> to be done _after_ the patch set is merged.
Well, accepted. It is going to make patches #11 and beyond.
Thanks,
Alexey
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
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