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Message-Id: <20200211135256.24617-37-joro@8bytes.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 14:52:30 +0100
From: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: hpa@...or.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@...are.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH 36/62] x86/sev-es: Add Runtime #VC Exception Handler
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Add the handler for #VC exceptions invoked at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 4 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 7 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index f2bb91e87877..729876d368c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1210,6 +1210,10 @@ idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault has_error_code=1 read_cr2=1
idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
+#endif
+
/*
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
* Use slow, but surefire "are we in kernel?" check.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 2aa786484bb1..1be25c065698 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ asmlinkage void alignment_check(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
asmlinkage void machine_check(void);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_MCE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+asmlinkage void vmm_communication(void);
+#endif
asmlinkage void simd_coprocessor_error(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV)
@@ -93,6 +96,10 @@ dotraplinkage void do_alignment_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
dotraplinkage void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
#endif
dotraplinkage void do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+dotraplinkage void do_vmm_communication_error(struct pt_regs *regs,
+ long error_code);
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
dotraplinkage void do_iret_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 1bfee6981e9b..94f6a5705e1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -95,8 +95,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
INTG(X86_TRAP_MC, &machine_check),
#endif
-
SYSG(X86_TRAP_OF, overflow),
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ INTG(X86_TRAP_VC, vmm_communication),
+#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_compat),
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 9a5530857db7..1fb7128ff386 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <asm/trap_defs.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
@@ -184,6 +184,81 @@ static enum es_result handle_vc_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return result;
}
+static void forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ long error_code = ctxt->fi.error_code;
+ int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector;
+
+ ctxt->regs->orig_ax = ctxt->fi.error_code;
+
+ switch (trapnr) {
+ case X86_TRAP_GP:
+ do_general_protection(ctxt->regs, error_code);
+ break;
+ case X86_TRAP_UD:
+ do_invalid_op(ctxt->regs, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+dotraplinkage void do_vmm_communication(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
+{
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result result;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ /*
+ * This is invoked through an interrupt gate, so IRQs are disabled. The
+ * code below might walk page-tables for user or kernel addresses, so
+ * keep the IRQs disabled to protect us against concurrent TLB flushes.
+ */
+
+ ghcb = this_cpu_ptr(&ghcb_page);
+
+ ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ result = init_em_ctxt(&ctxt, regs, exit_code);
+
+ if (result == ES_OK)
+ result = handle_vc_exception(&ctxt, ghcb, exit_code);
+
+ /* Done - now check the result */
+ switch (result) {
+ case ES_OK:
+ finish_insn(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_UNSUPPORTED:
+ pr_emerg("Unsupported exit-code 0x%02lx in early #VC exception (IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_VMM_ERROR:
+ pr_emerg("PANIC: Failure in communication with VMM (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_DECODE_FAILED:
+ pr_emerg("PANIC: Failed to decode instruction (exit-code 0x%02lx IP: 0x%lx)\n",
+ exit_code, regs->ip);
+ goto fail;
+ case ES_EXCEPTION:
+ forward_exception(&ctxt);
+ break;
+ case ES_RETRY:
+ /* Nothing to do */
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+fail:
+ show_regs(regs);
+
+ while (true)
+ halt();
+}
+
int __init boot_vc_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long exit_code = regs->orig_ax;
--
2.17.1
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