linux-kernel - [Bluez PATCH v3] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack

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Message-Id: <20200212212316.Bluez.v3.1.Ia71869d2f3e19a76a6a352c61088a085a1d41ba6@changeid>
Date:   Wed, 12 Feb 2020 21:23:23 +0800
From:   Howard Chung <howardchung@...gle.com>
To:     linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org, marcel@...tmann.org
Cc:     chromeos-bluetooth-upstreaming@...omium.org,
        Howard Chung <howardchung@...gle.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@...il.com>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [Bluez PATCH v3] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack

Attack scenario:
1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
   Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
   B).
2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
   Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
   be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
   (technically, doing Page Scan).
4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
   (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
   connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
   same as device B's address.
5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
   profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
   encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
   But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
   model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
   notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
   new different link key, common between device A and C.
6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
   connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
   speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.

Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
- the pairing is initialized by peer
- the authorization method is just-work
- host already had the link key to the peer

Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@...gle.com>
---

Changes in v3:
- Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
- Fix coding style (declaration order)

Changes in v2:
- Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
- Fix the added code in classic
- Add a similar fix for LE

 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 			goto confirm;
 		}
 
+		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+		 * legitimate or malicious.
+		 */
+		if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
+			bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
+			confirm_hint = 1;
+			goto confirm;
+		}
+
 		BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
 		       hdev->auto_accept_delay);
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 2cba6e07c02b..1483ceea3bab 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2139,6 +2139,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_ltk *key;
 	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
 	u32 passkey;
 	int err;
@@ -2192,6 +2193,23 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				   hcon->role);
+
+		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+		 * legitimate or malicious.
+		 */
+		if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS && key) {
+			err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+							hcon->type,
+							hcon->dst_type, passkey,
+							1);
+			if (err)
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		}
 	}
 
 mackey_and_ltk:
-- 
2.25.0.225.g125e21ebc7-goog