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Message-ID: <CAKFsvU+zaY6B_+g=UTpOddKXXgVaKWxH3c8nw6GSLceb1Mg2qA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 16:19:27 -0800
From: Patricia Alfonso <trishalfonso@...gle.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
anton.ivanov@...bridgegreys.com,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
David Gow <davidgow@...gle.com>,
Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@...gle.com>,
linux-um@...ts.infradead.org,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] UML: add support for KASAN under x86_64
On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 12:53 AM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > +void kasan_init(void)
> > +{
> > + kasan_map_memory((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE);
> > +
> > + // unpoison the kernel text which is form uml_physmem -> uml_reserved
> > + kasan_unpoison_shadow((void *)uml_physmem, physmem_size);
> > +
> > + // unpoison the vmalloc region, which is start_vm -> end_vm
> > + kasan_unpoison_shadow((void *)start_vm, (end_vm - start_vm + 1));
> > +
> > + init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
> > + pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
> > +}
>
> Was this tested with stack instrumentation? Stack instrumentation
> changes what shadow is being read/written and when. We don't need to
> get it working right now, but if it does not work it would be nice to
> restrict the setting and leave some comment traces for future
> generations.
If you are referring to KASAN_STACK_ENABLE, I just tested it and it
seems to work fine.
--
Patricia Alfonso
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