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Message-Id: <20200213151902.169820776@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 13 Feb 2020 07:19:54 -0800
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>,
        Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 050/116] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>

commit 8c86405f606ca8508b8d9280680166ca26723695 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

Fixes: a2c118bfab8b ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
@@ -74,13 +74,14 @@ static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirec
 	default:
 		{
 			u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
-			u64 redir_content;
+			u64 redir_content = ~0ULL;
 
-			if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
-				redir_content =
-					ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
-			else
-				redir_content = ~0ULL;
+			if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS) {
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					redir_index, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
+
+				redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[index].bits;
+			}
 
 			result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
 			    (redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :


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