linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.5 40/80] drm/vgem: Close use-after-free race in vgem_gem

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Message-Id: <20200218190436.210849575@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 18 Feb 2020 20:55:01 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
        Hillf Danton <hdanton@...a.com>,
        syzbot+0dc4444774d419e916c8@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@...labora.com>,
        Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
        Sean Paul <seanpaul@...omium.org>,
        Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>,
        Eric Anholt <eric@...olt.net>, Sam Ravnborg <sam@...nborg.org>,
        Rob Clark <robdclark@...omium.org>,
        Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.5 40/80] drm/vgem: Close use-after-free race in vgem_gem_create

From: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>

commit 4b848f20eda5974020f043ca14bacf7a7e634fc8 upstream.

There's two references floating around here (for the object reference,
not the handle_count reference, that's a different thing):

- The temporary reference held by vgem_gem_create, acquired by
  creating the object and released by calling
  drm_gem_object_put_unlocked.

- The reference held by the object handle, created by
  drm_gem_handle_create. This one generally outlives the function,
  except if a 2nd thread races with a GEM_CLOSE ioctl call.

So usually everything is correct, except in that race case, where the
access to gem_object->size could be looking at freed data already.
Which again isn't a real problem (userspace shot its feet off already
with the race, we could return garbage), but maybe someone can exploit
this as an information leak.

Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@...a.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+0dc4444774d419e916c8@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@...labora.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>
Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul@...omium.org>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@...olt.net>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@...nborg.org>
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@...omium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...el.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200202132133.1891846-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vgem/vgem_drv.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vgem/vgem_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vgem/vgem_drv.c
@@ -196,9 +196,10 @@ static struct drm_gem_object *vgem_gem_c
 		return ERR_CAST(obj);
 
 	ret = drm_gem_handle_create(file, &obj->base, handle);
-	drm_gem_object_put_unlocked(&obj->base);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		drm_gem_object_put_unlocked(&obj->base);
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
 	return &obj->base;
 }
@@ -221,7 +222,9 @@ static int vgem_gem_dumb_create(struct d
 	args->size = gem_object->size;
 	args->pitch = pitch;
 
-	DRM_DEBUG("Created object of size %lld\n", size);
+	drm_gem_object_put_unlocked(gem_object);
+
+	DRM_DEBUG("Created object of size %llu\n", args->size);
 
 	return 0;
 }