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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2002190622060.10165@namei.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON
privileged process
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and
> namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
> access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
> and makes operation more secure.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
> remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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