linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/2] virtio: decouple protected guest RAM form VIRTIO_F_IOMMU

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Message-ID: <20200220162747-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Thu, 20 Feb 2020 16:29:50 -0500
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Halil Pasic <pasic@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
        Janosch Frank <frankja@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>,
        Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>,
        Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>,
        "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
        Michael Mueller <mimu@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] virtio: decouple protected guest RAM form
 VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 05:06:04PM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> * This usage is not congruent with  standardised semantics of
> VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Guest memory protected is an orthogonal reason
> for using DMA API in virtio (orthogonal with respect to what is
> expressed by VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM). 

Quoting the spec:

  \item[VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM(33)] This feature indicates that
  the device can be used on a platform where device access to data
  in memory is limited and/or translated. E.g. this is the case if the device can be located
  behind an IOMMU that translates bus addresses from the device into physical
  addresses in memory, if the device can be limited to only access
  certain memory addresses or if special commands such as
  a cache flush can be needed to synchronise data in memory with
  the device. Whether accesses are actually limited or translated
  is described by platform-specific means.
  If this feature bit is set to 0, then the device
  has same access to memory addresses supplied to it as the
  driver has.
  In particular, the device will always use physical addresses
  matching addresses used by the driver (typically meaning
  physical addresses used by the CPU)
  and not translated further, and can access any address supplied to it by
  the driver. When clear, this overrides any platform-specific description of
  whether device access is limited or translated in any way, e.g.
  whether an IOMMU may be present.

since device can't access encrypted memory,
this seems to match your case reasonably well.

-- 
MST