linux-kernel - [PATCH v9 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted

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Message-Id: <20200225173933.74818-8-samitolvanen@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Feb 2020 09:39:28 -0800
From:   Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
        clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted

If we detect a corrupted x18, restore the register before jumping back
to potentially SCS instrumented code. This is safe, because the wrapper
is called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
for interrupt handling.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S
index 3fc71106cb2b..6ca6c0dc11a1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S
@@ -34,5 +34,14 @@ ENTRY(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)
 	ldp	x29, x30, [sp], #32
 	b.ne	0f
 	ret
-0:	b	efi_handle_corrupted_x18	// tail call
+0:
+	/*
+	 * With CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, the kernel uses x18 to store a
+	 * shadow stack pointer, which we need to restore before returning to
+	 * potentially instrumented code. This is safe because the wrapper is
+	 * called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
+	 * for interrupts.
+	 */
+	mov	x18, x2
+	b	efi_handle_corrupted_x18	// tail call
 ENDPROC(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)
-- 
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog