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Message-ID: <20200226195710.6sma4whvs3o76oux@ucw.cz>
Date:   Wed, 26 Feb 2020 20:57:10 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, x86-patch-review@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for
 user-mode Shadow Stack protection

> On 2/5/20 10:19 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > Introduce Kconfig option: X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.
> > 
> > Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against function return address
> > corruption.  It is active when the kernel has this feature enabled, and
> > both the processor and the application support it.  When this feature is
> > enabled, legacy non-SHSTK applications continue to work, but without SHSTK
> > protection.
> > 
> > The user-mode SHSTK protection is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.
> > IA32 applications are supported under the compatibility mode.
> 
> I think what you're trying to say here is that the hardware supports
> shadow stacks with 32-bit kernels.  However, this series does not
> include that support and we have no plans to add it.
> 
> Right?
> 
> I'll let others weigh in, but I rather dislike the use of acronyms here.
>  I'd much rather see the english "shadow stack" everywhere than SHSTK.

For the record, I like "shadow stack" better, too.

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