linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 06/97] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1

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Message-Id: <20200227132215.620415637@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 27 Feb 2020 14:36:14 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 06/97] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()

From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>

commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 1 packet contains key larger "
 		       "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free;
 	}
 	memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key,
 	       &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2)));