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Message-Id: <20200227132239.646778367@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 14:36:22 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@...il.com>,
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@...inger.net>
Subject: [PATCH 5.5 045/150] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@...inger.net>
commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream.
In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@...il.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@...il.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16")
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@...inger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-2-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2798,7 +2798,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_
goto out;
}
- if (!p->pointer) {
+ if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
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