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Message-Id: <20200227132212.516450291@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 14:35:20 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 004/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>
commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.
In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@...uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt
printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n",
ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE);
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ goto out_free;
}
/* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or
* at end of function upon failure */
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