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Message-Id: <20200227132251.928547530@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 14:36:58 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 144/165] netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
[ Upstream commit 6ab405114b0b229151ef06f4e31c7834dd09d0c0 ]
Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too
big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap
memory disclosure or oopses.
This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module
is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf
module can be autoloaded.
Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes
the following KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627
CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x5c/0x85
print_address_description+0x6a/0x260
kasan_report+0x254/0x370
? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf]
[...]
Allocated by task 4627:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60
xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables]
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0)
[...]
==================================================================
Fixes: e6f30c731718 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
index dffee9d47ec4b..7b993f25aab92 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ static int bpf_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
struct xt_bpf_info *info = par->matchinfo;
struct sock_fprog_kern program;
+ if (info->bpf_program_num_elem > XT_BPF_MAX_NUM_INSTR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
program.len = info->bpf_program_num_elem;
program.filter = info->bpf_program;
--
2.20.1
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