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Message-ID: <AM6PR03MB5170B06F3A2B75EFB98D071AE4E60@AM6PR03MB5170.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2020 11:27:18 +0000
From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Yuyang Du <duyuyang@...il.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Christian Kellner <christian@...lner.me>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: [PATCH] exec: Fix a deadlock in ptrace
This fixes a deadlock in the tracer when tracing a multi-threaded
application that calls execve while more than one thread are running.
I observed that when running strace on the gcc test suite, it always
blocks after a while, when expect calls execve, because other threads
have to be terminated. They send ptrace events, but the strace is no
longer able to respond, since it is blocked in vm_access.
The deadlock is always happening when strace needs to access the
tracees process mmap, while another thread in the tracee starts to
execve a child process, but that cannot continue until the
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT is handled and the WIFEXITED event is received:
strace D 0 30614 30584 0x00000000
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x20
__mutex_lock.isra.13+0x1ec/0x520
__mutex_lock_killable_slowpath+0x13/0x20
mutex_lock_killable+0x28/0x30
mm_access+0x27/0xa0
process_vm_rw_core.isra.3+0xff/0x550
process_vm_rw+0xdd/0xf0
__x64_sys_process_vm_readv+0x31/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
expect D 0 31933 30876 0x80004003
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
flush_old_exec+0xc4/0x770
load_elf_binary+0x35a/0x16c0
search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0
__do_execve_file.isra.40+0x5d4/0x8a0
__x64_sys_execve+0x49/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The proposed solution is to have a second mutex that is
used in mm_access, so it is allowed to continue while the
dying threads are not yet terminated.
I also took the opportunity to improve the documentation
of prepare_creds, which is obviously out of sync.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
---
Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 18 ++++++++++--------
fs/exec.c | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/binfmts.h | 6 +++++-
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 1 +
init/init_task.c | 1 +
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c | 5 +++--
mm/process_vm_access.c | 2 +-
8 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
index 282e79f..c98e0a8 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
@@ -437,9 +437,13 @@ new set of credentials by calling::
struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
-this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a
-duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still
-held if successful. It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+this allocates and constructs a duplicate of the current process's credentials.
+It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+
+If called from __do_execve_file, the mutex current->signal->cred_guard_mutex
+is acquired before this function gets called, and the mutex
+current->signal->cred_change_mutex is acquired later, while the credentials
+and the process mmap are actually changed.
The mutex prevents ``ptrace()`` from altering the ptrace state of a process
while security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place
@@ -466,9 +470,8 @@ by calling::
This will alter various aspects of the credentials and the process, giving the
LSM a chance to do likewise, then it will use ``rcu_assign_pointer()`` to
-actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, it will release
-``current->cred_replace_mutex`` to allow ``ptrace()`` to take place, and it
-will notify the scheduler and others of the changes.
+actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, and it will notify
+the scheduler and others of the changes.
This function is guaranteed to return 0, so that it can be tail-called at the
end of such functions as ``sys_setresuid()``.
@@ -486,8 +489,7 @@ invoked::
void abort_creds(struct cred *new);
-This releases the lock on ``current->cred_replace_mutex`` that
-``prepare_creds()`` got and then releases the new credentials.
+This releases the new credentials.
A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this::
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 74d88da..a6884e4 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1266,6 +1266,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
+ retval = mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out;
+
+ bprm->called_flush_old_exec = 1;
+
/*
* Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
* not visibile until then. This also enables the update
@@ -1420,6 +1426,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
+ if (bprm->called_flush_old_exec)
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
@@ -1469,6 +1477,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
*/
security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index b40fc63..2e1318b 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ struct linux_binprm {
* exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment
* and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
*/
- secureexec:1;
+ secureexec:1,
+ /*
+ * Set by flush_old_exec, when the cred_change_mutex is taken.
+ */
+ called_flush_old_exec:1;
#ifdef __alpha__
unsigned int taso:1;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 8805025..37eeabe 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ struct signal_struct {
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace) */
+ struct mutex cred_change_mutex; /* guard against credentials change */
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index 9e5cbe5..6cd9a0f 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
.multiprocess = HLIST_HEAD_INIT,
.rlim = INIT_RLIMITS,
.cred_guard_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_guard_mutex),
+ .cred_change_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_change_mutex),
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
.posix_timers = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.posix_timers),
.cputimer = {
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985..e4c78de 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
*
* Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
*
- * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
+ * Does not take, and does not return holding ->cred_guard_mutex.
*/
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 0808095..0395154 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
- err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_change_mutex);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mmput(mm);
mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_change_mutex);
return mm;
}
@@ -1594,6 +1594,7 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min;
mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ mutex_init(&sig->cred_change_mutex);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index 357aa7b..b3e6eb5 100644
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter,
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
/*
- * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more a
+ * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more
* appropriate error code for process_vw_readv/writev
*/
if (rc == -EACCES)
--
1.9.1
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