linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v9 7/7] KVM: X86: Add user-space access interface for CET MSRs

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Date:   Thu, 5 Mar 2020 20:31:31 +0800
From:   Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        jmattson@...gle.com, yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 7/7] KVM: X86: Add user-space access interface for CET
 MSRs

On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 07:45:38AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 11:18:15PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 02:28:27PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > @@ -1886,6 +1976,26 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > > >  		else
> > > >  			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
> > > >  		break;
> > > > +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> > > > +		if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
> > > > +			return 1;
> > > > +		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> > > > +		break;
> > > > +	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> > > > +		if (!cet_ssp_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
> > > > +			return 1;
> > > > +		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> > > > +		break;
> > > > +	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> > > > +		if (!cet_ctl_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
> > > > +			return 1;
> > > > +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_info->data);
> > > > +		break;
> > > > +	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> > > > +		if (!cet_ssp_access_allowed(vcpu, msr_info))
> > > > +			return 1;
> > > > +		rdmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data);
> > > 
> > > Ugh, thought of another problem.  If a SoftIRQ runs after an IRQ it can
> > > load the kernel FPU state.  So for all the XSAVES MSRs we'll need a helper
> > > similar to vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(), except XSAVES has to be even
> > > more restrictive and disable IRQs entirely.  E.g.
> > > 
> > > static void vmx_get_xsave_msr(struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > > {
> > > 	local_irq_disable();
> > > 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> > > 		switch_fpu_return();
> > > 	rdmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data);
> > > 	local_irq_enable();
> > In this case, would SoftIRQ destroy vcpu->arch.guest.fpu states which
> > had been restored to XSAVES MSRs that we were accessing?
> 
> Doing kernel_fpu_begin() from a softirq would swap guest.fpu out of the
> CPUs registers.  It sets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD to mark the tasks has needing to
> reload its FPU state prior to returning to userspace.  So it doesn't
> destroy it per se.  The result is that KVM would read/write the CET MSRs
> after they're loaded from the kernel's FPU state instead of reading the
> MSRs loaded from the guest's FPU state.
>
OK, will wrap the access code with a helper, thank you!
> > So should we restore
> > guest.fpu or? In previous patch, we have restored guest.fpu before
> > access the XSAVES MSRs.
> 
> There are three different FPU states:
> 
>   - kernel
>   - userspace
>   - guest
> 
> RDMSR/WRMSR for CET MSRs need to run while the guest.fpu state is loaded
> into the CPU registers[1].  At the beginning of the syscall from userspace,
> i.e. the vCPU ioctl(), the task's FPU state[2] holds userspace FPU state.
> Patch 6/7 swaps out the userspace state and loads the guest state.
> 
> But, if a softirq runs between kvm_load_guest_fpu() and now, and executes
> kernel_fpu_begin(), it will swap the guest state (out of CPU registers)
> and load the kernel state (into PCU registers).  The actual RDMSR/WRMSR
> needs to ensure the guest state is still loaded by checking and handling
> TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD.
> 
> [1] An alternative to doing switch_fpu_return() on TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD would
>     be to calculate the offset into the xsave and read/write directly
>     to/from memory.  But IMO that's unnecessary complexity as the guest's
>     fpu state still needs to be reloaded before re-entering the guest, e.g.
>     if vmx_{g,s}et_msr() is invoked on {RD,WR}MSR intercept, while loading
>     or saving MSR state from userspace isn't a hot path.
> 
> [2] I worded this to say "task's FPU state" because it's also possible the
>     CPU registers hold kernel state at the beginning of the vCPU ioctl(),
>     e.g. because of softirq.

It's clear to me, thanks for the explanation.