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Message-ID: <87k13yawpp.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 23:17:22 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] exec: Add a exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de> writes:
> On 3/5/20 10:16 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>
>> The cred_guard_mutex is problematic. The cred_guard_mutex is held
>> over the userspace accesses as the arguments from userspace are read.
>> The cred_guard_mutex is held of PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT as the the other
>> threads are killed. The cred_guard_mutex is held over
>> "put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid)" in exit_mm().
>>
>> Any of those can result in deadlock, as the cred_guard_mutex is held
>> over a possible indefinite userspace waits for userspace.
>>
>> Add exec_update_mutex that is only held over exec updating process
>> with the new contents of exec, so that code that needs not to be
>> confused by exec changing the mm and the cred in ways that can not
>> happen during ordinary execution of a process can take.
>>
>> The plan is to switch the users of cred_guard_mutex to
>> exed_udpate_mutex one by one. This lets us move forward while still
>> being careful and not introducing any regressions.
>>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160921152946.GA24210@dhcp22.suse.cz/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AM6PR03MB5170B06F3A2B75EFB98D071AE4E60@AM6PR03MB5170.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20161102181806.GB1112@redhat.com/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160923095031.GA14923@redhat.com/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170213141452.GA30203@redhat.com/
>> Ref: 45c1a159b85b ("Add PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE and PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT facilities.")
>> Ref: 456f17cd1a28 ("[PATCH] user-vm-unlock-2.5.31-A2")
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>> ---
>> fs/exec.c | 4 ++++
>> include/linux/sched/signal.h | 9 ++++++++-
>> kernel/fork.c | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index c243f9660d46..ad7b518f906d 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static int de_thread(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct task_struct *tsk)
>> release_task(leader);
>> }
>>
>> + mutex_lock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>> bprm->unrecoverable = true;
>> sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
>> sig->notify_count = 0;
>> @@ -1425,6 +1426,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> {
>> free_arg_pages(bprm);
>> if (bprm->cred) {
>> + if (bprm->unrecoverable)
>> + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
>> abort_creds(bprm->cred);
>> }
>> @@ -1474,6 +1477,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
>> */
>> security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
>> + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>> index 88050259c466..a29df79540ce 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>> @@ -224,7 +224,14 @@ struct signal_struct {
>>
>> struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
>> * credential calculations
>> - * (notably. ptrace) */
>> + * (notably. ptrace)
>> + * Deprecated do not use in new code.
>> + * Use exec_update_mutex instead.
>> + */
>> + struct mutex exec_update_mutex; /* Held while task_struct is being
>> + * updated during exec, and may have
>> + * inconsistent permissions.
>> + */
>> } __randomize_layout;
>>
>> /*
>> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
>> index 60a1295f4384..12896a6ecee6 100644
>> --- a/kernel/fork.c
>> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
>> @@ -1594,6 +1594,7 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
>> sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min;
>>
>> mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
>> + mutex_init(&sig->exec_update_mutex);
>>
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
> Don't you need to add something like this to init/init_task.c ?
>
> .exec_update_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.exec_update_mutex),
Yes. I overlooked that. Thank you.
Eric
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