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Message-ID: <20200309181154.GB1073@sol.localdomain>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 11:11:54 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+af962bf9e7e27bccd025@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
len.brown@...el.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux PM <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com>
Subject: Re: KMSAN: uninit-value in snapshot_compat_ioctl
On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 12:53:28PM +0100, 'Alexander Potapenko' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
> > > Looks like a KMSAN false positive? As far as I can tell, the memory is being
> > > initialized by put_user() called under set_fs(KERNEL_DS).
>
> Why? put_user() doesn't write to kernel memory, instead it copies a
> value to the userspace.
> That's why KMSAN performs kmsan_check_memory() on it.
> It would actually be better if KMSAN printed an kernel-infoleak warning instead.
When under set_fs(KERNEL_DS), the userspace access functions like put_user() and
copy_to_user() can write to kernel memory. It's discouraged and people have
been trying to get rid of uses of set_fs(), but a lot still remain, since
sometimes it's useful to allow code to operate on both user and kernel memory.
A common example is kernel_read().
>
> > Although, it also looks like the problematic code can just be removed, since
> > always sizeof(compat_loff_t) == sizeof(loff_t). I'll send a patch to do that...
>
> Thanks!
>
- Eric
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