linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <9b7ff325-d7cd-9309-d060-ad641486d106@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 9 Mar 2020 12:35:22 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, x86-patch-review@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description

On 3/9/20 12:27 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-03-09 at 10:21 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 3/9/20 10:00 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 09:57 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote>>>>> +Note:
>>>>> +  There is no CET-enabling arch_prctl function.  By design, CET is
>>>>> +  enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
>>>>
>>>> This is kinda interesting.  It means that a JIT couldn't choose to
>>>> protect the code it generates and have different rules from itself?
>>>
>>> JIT needs to be updated for CET first.  Once that is done, it runs with CET
>>> enabled.  It can use the NOTRACK prefix, for example.
>>
>> Am I missing something?
>>
>> What's the direct connection between shadow stacks and Indirect Branch
>> Tracking other than Intel marketing umbrellas?
> 
> What I meant is that JIT code needs to be updated first; if it skips RETs,
> it needs to unwind the stack, and if it does indirect JMPs somewhere it
> needs to fix up the branch target or use NOTRACK.

I'm totally lost.  I think we have very different models of how a JIT
might generate and run code.

I can totally see a scenario where a JIT goes and generates a bunch of
code, then forks a new thread to go run that code.  The control flow of
the JIT thread itself *NEVER* interacts with the control flow of the
program it writes.  They never share a stack and nothing ever jumps or
rets between the two worlds.

Does anything actually do that?  I've got no idea.  But, I can clearly
see a world where the entirety of Chrome and Firefox and the entire rust
runtime might not be fully recompiled and CET-enabled for a while.  But,
we still want the JIT-generated code to be CET-protected since it has
the most exposed attack surface.

I don't think that's too far-fetched.