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Message-ID: <87k13svxtw.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:01:15 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra \(Intel\)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Yuyang Du <duyuyang@...il.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Christian Kellner <christian@...lner.me>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
"linux-doc\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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"linux-api\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] kernel/kcmp.c: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de> writes:
> This changes kcmp_epoll_target to use the new exec_update_mutex
> instead of cred_guard_mutex.
>
> This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading,
> and furthermore ->mm and ->sighand are updated on execve,
> but only under the new exec_update_mutex.
>
Can you add a comment that the exec_update_mutex is not needed for
KCMP_FILE? As both sets of credentials during exec are valid
for accessing the files so exec_update_mutex does not matter.
I don't think exec_update_mutex is needed for KCMP_SYSVSEM
or KCMP_EPOLL_TFD either. As I don't think exec changes either
one of those.
Eric
> Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
> ---
> kernel/kcmp.c | 8 ++++----
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c
> index a0e3d7a..b3ff928 100644
> --- a/kernel/kcmp.c
> +++ b/kernel/kcmp.c
> @@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
> /*
> * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
> */
> - ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
> - &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex,
> + &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex);
> if (ret)
> goto err;
> if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
> @@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
> }
>
> err_unlock:
> - kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
> - &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex,
> + &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex);
> err:
> put_task_struct(task1);
> put_task_struct(task2);
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