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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.2003091742500.156701@chino.kir.corp.google.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 17:43:50 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
To: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>
cc: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@...hat.com>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, davem@...emloft.net,
"Hook, Gary" <gary.hook@....com>, erdemaktas@...gle.com,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] crypto: ccp: use file mode for sev ioctl
permissions
On Mon, 9 Mar 2020, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
> > > Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user,
> > > check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that
> > > can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access
> > > control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user
> > > or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them
> > > to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions.
> > >
> > > For example:
> > >
> > > chown root:root /dev/sev
> > > chmod 600 /dev/sev
> >
> > Hi Connor,
> >
> > I'm curious why do you need to do the two above commands? It implies that
> > /dev/sev is either not owned by root or that it is not already restricted
> > to only being owner read and writable.
> >
> > Or perhaps these two commands were included only for clarity to explain
> > what the defaults should be?
>
> Correct. Those are just exemplary. They represent the existing permissions.
>
Sounds good, thanks. Maybe showing what ls -l /dev/sev looks like by
default in the changelog would make it clear. Otherwise looks good.
> > > setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev
> > > setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev
> > >
> > > In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to
> > > perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state).
> > > Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not
> > > modify the platform state.
> > >
> > > This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file
> > > descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> > > the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute
> > > ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file
> > > descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to
> > > modify the platform state.
> > >
> > > This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by
> > > the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to
> > > /dev/sev.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@...hat.com>
> > > ---
> > > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++----------------
> > > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> > > index e467860f797d..416b80938a3e 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> > > @@ -283,11 +283,11 @@ static int sev_get_platform_state(int *state, int *error)
> > > return rc;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > +static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
> > > {
> > > int state, rc;
> > >
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > + if (!writable)
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > /*
> > > @@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > +static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
> > > {
> > > struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> > > int rc;
> > >
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > + if (!writable)
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > if (sev->state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> > > @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, NULL, &argp->error);
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > +static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
> > > {
> > > struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> > > struct sev_user_data_pek_csr input;
> > > @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > void *blob = NULL;
> > > int ret;
> > >
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > + if (!writable)
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
> > > @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static int sev_update_firmware(struct device *dev)
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > +static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
> > > {
> > > struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> > > struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import input;
> > > @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > void *pek_blob, *oca_blob;
> > > int ret;
> > >
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > + if (!writable)
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
> > > @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_get_id(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > > +static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
> > > {
> > > struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> > > struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export input;
> > > @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> > >
> > > /* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT. */
> > > if (sev->state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > + if (!writable)
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error);
> > > @@ -801,6 +801,7 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> > > void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
> > > struct sev_issue_cmd input;
> > > int ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + bool writable = file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE;
> > >
> > > if (!psp_master || !psp_master->sev_data)
> > > return -ENODEV;
> > > @@ -819,25 +820,25 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> > > switch (input.cmd) {
> > >
> > > case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS:
> > > ret = sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(&input);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PEK_GEN:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PDH_GEN:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PEK_CSR:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
> > > - ret = sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(&input);
> > > + ret = sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(&input, writable);
> > > break;
> > > case SEV_GET_ID:
> > > pr_warn_once("SEV_GET_ID command is deprecated, use SEV_GET_ID2\n");
> > > --
> > > 2.24.1
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
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