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Message-Id: <20200310123650.321435804@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 13:39:02 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.5 105/189] x86/pkeys: Manually set X86_FEATURE_OSPKE to preserve existing changes
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
commit 735a6dd02222d8d070c7bb748f25895239ca8c92 upstream.
Explicitly set X86_FEATURE_OSPKE via set_cpu_cap() instead of calling
get_cpu_cap() to pull the feature bit from CPUID after enabling CR4.PKE.
Invoking get_cpu_cap() effectively wipes out any {set,clear}_cpu_cap()
changes that were made between this_cpu->c_init() and setup_pku(), as
all non-synthetic feature words are reinitialized from the CPU's CPUID
values.
Blasting away capability updates manifests most visibility when running
on a VMX capable CPU, but with VMX disabled by BIOS. To indicate that
VMX is disabled, init_ia32_feat_ctl() clears X86_FEATURE_VMX, using
clear_cpu_cap() instead of setup_clear_cpu_cap() so that KVM can report
which CPU is misconfigured (KVM needs to probe every CPU anyways).
Restoring X86_FEATURE_VMX from CPUID causes KVM to think VMX is enabled,
ultimately leading to an unexpected #GP when KVM attempts to do VMXON.
Arguably, init_ia32_feat_ctl() should use setup_clear_cpu_cap() and let
KVM figure out a different way to report the misconfigured CPU, but VMX
is not the only feature bit that is affected, i.e. there is precedent
that tweaking feature bits via {set,clear}_cpu_cap() after ->c_init()
is expected to work. Most notably, x86_init_rdrand()'s clearing of
X86_FEATURE_RDRAND when RDRAND malfunctions is also overwritten.
Fixes: 0697694564c8 ("x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU")
Reported-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200226231615.13664-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_pku(st
* cpuid bit to be set. We need to ensure that we
* update that bit in this CPU's "cpu_info".
*/
- get_cpu_cap(c);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_OSPKE);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
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