linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] slub: Relocate freelist pointer to middle of object

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Message-ID: <202003111039.24B8A0B@keescook>
Date:   Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:44:09 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     'Christopher Lameter' <cl@...ux.com>
Cc:     David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
        Vitaly Nikolenko <vnik@...synt.com>,
        Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@...il.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] slub: Relocate freelist pointer to middle of object

From: Christopher Lameter
> Sent: 08 March 2020 19:21
> 
> On Thu, 5 Mar 2020, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> > Instead of having the freelist pointer at the very beginning of an
> > allocation (offset 0) or at the very end of an allocation (effectively
> > offset -sizeof(void *) from the next allocation), move it away from
> > the edges of the allocation and into the middle. This provides some
> > protection against small-sized neighboring overflows (or underflows),
> > for which the freelist pointer is commonly the target. (Large or well
> > controlled overwrites are much more likely to attack live object contents,
> > instead of attempting freelist corruption.)
> 
> Sounds good. You could even randomize the position to avoid attacks on via
> the freelist pointer.

That's a good point. "offset" is just calculated once, and for many
slabs, the available space is quite large. I wonder what the best
practice might be for how far from the edge to stay. Hmmm. Maybe simply
carve it into thirds, and randomize the offset within the middle third?

-- 
Kees Cook