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Message-ID: <202003111203.738487D@keescook>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 12:08:08 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Yuyang Du <duyuyang@...il.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Christian Kellner <christian@...lner.me>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] proc: io_accounting: Use new infrastructure to fix
deadlocks in execve
On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 06:45:47PM +0100, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> This changes do_io_accounting to use the new exec_update_mutex
> instead of cred_guard_mutex.
>
> This fixes possible deadlocks when the trace is accessing
> /proc/$pid/io for instance.
>
> This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading.
I'd like to see the rationale described better here for why it should be
safe. I'm still not seeing why this is safe here, as we might check
ptrace_may_access() with one cred and then iterate io accounting with a
different credential...
What am I missing?
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 4fdfe4f..529d0c6 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2770,7 +2770,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh
> unsigned long flags;
> int result;
>
> - result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
> if (result)
> return result;
>
> @@ -2806,7 +2806,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh
> result = 0;
>
> out_unlock:
> - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
> return result;
> }
>
> --
> 1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
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